


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RULERS OF INDIA

EDITED BY

SIR WILLIAM WILSON HUNTER



HENRY FROWDE, M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK

TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

THE INDIAN EMPIRE

Prepared for Sir William Wilson Hunter's

IMPERIAL GAZETTEER OF INDIA

Scale 265 miles = 1 inch

0 100 200 300 400



REFERENCES

Boundaries opened
Do not opened
Route
The numerals denote the height above sea level in feet
This Map is intended only to exhibit the principal places, other rivers in India

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CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN



*Biog
Rulers of India
series*

BY

SIR OWEN TUDOR BURNE, K.C.S.I.

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
M DCCC XCV

PREFACE



IN writing the following account of the Indian Mutiny operations, I have not attempted to discuss political measures which have already been dealt with by more practised writers than myself, but have merely endeavoured to verify, and in some cases to correct, the military narrative by my own personal recollections, and to present it to the public in an abridged and readable form. The helpful revision of the manuscript by Mr. Stephen Wheeler and the editor is entitled to my sincere acknowledgments.

O. T. B.

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CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE GREAT REVOLT



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE thrilling incidents and heroic deeds of the Indian Mutiny have already been so graphically recounted by historians and biographers that it is difficult to invest the subject with new interest, or to compress the narrative within reasonable limits. An attempt will be made, however, in the present volume to describe in general terms the military operations rendered necessary for the suppression of the revolt; indicating, as briefly as practicable, the causes of the outbreak, and the sequence of events during the anxious months of 1857, when British rule seemed for a moment to tremble in the balance.

To realise the position of affairs in that year, and the magnitude of the danger, it must be borne in mind that India is not a united country containing a homogeneous population, but a congeries of countries inhabited by races who in number (287,000,000)

are double the population of the Roman Empire at the time of its greatest extent, who speak a variety of languages, hold many creeds, observe widely different customs, and present every type and degree of civilisation.

We are dealing, too, with immense areas. The single Lieutenant-Governorship of Lower Bengal is as large as France; Madras exceeds Great Britain and Ireland; Bombay equals Germany; the North-Western Provinces and Oudh cover as much space as Great Britain, Belgium, and Holland; the size of the Punjab is that of Italy; while the Native States put together have an area equal to that of Great Britain and Ireland, Germany, and France combined.

Bearing these facts in mind it will be seen that the suppression of an outbreak of upwards of 100,000 trained Sepoys¹ was no easy task; while to have held the country during the earlier stages of the revolt, with a mere handful of British troops, was an achievement to which Englishmen may ever point with becoming pride.

The bulk of the population of India may for the purposes of this volume be regarded as divisible into Hindus and Muhammadans, inasmuch as these two classes inhabit in greater or less numbers every one of its provinces, and figure almost exclusively in the events of the Mutiny. Speaking generally, the

¹ Out of seventy-four regular regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry forty-five mutinied, twenty were disarmed, and three were disbanded. Only six remained true to their salt.

typical Hindu is quiet, industrious, and tolerant in religious matters unless provoked to excitement. As a soldier he is obedient and patient, although warped by those caste prejudices which have always given the Bráhmans special control over comrades and subordinates. These qualities were strongly marked in the mutinous Sepoys. The Muhammadan, on his part, is by nature restless, fanatical, and ready for any adventure that may come to hand. In Northern India he is, as a rule, a born soldier, and even in the South he still retains in some measure the martial instincts which inspired his forefathers.

Such, briefly, were the characteristics of the people with whom the British Government and its administrators in the India of thirty-four years ago had to deal. They laboured under the disadvantage of being separated from those people by blood, religion, and character, and had therefore to contend with the almost insuperable difficulty of ignorance as to the undercurrents of public feeling. To obtain trustworthy information from the natives was in fact all but impossible, while the motives of the governing power were as constantly liable to be misunderstood and misrepresented by conquered races.

It cannot be said that the storm burst without warning. Months before the actual outbreak of the mutinous Sepoys, an idea had taken hold of a large number of persons within range of Hindu and Muhammadan influence that a crisis in the world's history was near at hand, that great events were impending,

and that the British Government was bent on departing from its ancient principles of non-interference with the customs, traditions, and religions of its Indian subjects. Englishmen were warned by native friends to be on their guard; and written prophecies¹ were spread broadcast throughout the land, foretelling the downfall of British power after the centenary of Plassey. Notwithstanding these indications, however, of ill-feeling and imminent disaster, the attitude of the people of India generally, during this eventful period, was one of neutrality. When once the outbreak became a fact, the only landholder who rebelled among the hundreds of Behar (one of the most disturbed districts in Bengal) was Koer Singh, a man whom pecuniary embarrassments had rendered notoriously desperate. Bengal, as a whole, remained tranquil. The Sikhs of the Punjab aided us. In the North-West Provinces the Hindus of Rohilkhand, forced for a time to submit to the rule of a rebel Muhammadan,

¹ The following is a free translation of one of such prophecies :—

The clan of Sikhs will exercise over Muhammadans great tyranny and oppression. For forty years the tyranny and the heresy will remain; after this the whole empire will be seized by the Nazarene (i. e. English). For the space of 100 years their sovereignty will remain in Hindustán, when in their time heresy and tyranny shall become general. Then, the King from the West shall appear. Between these two will be fought desperate battles. The King from the West shall be victorious. Then, without doubt, the followers of the clan of Jesus will be broken, discomfited, and dispersed. For forty years the Musalmán power shall be triumphant, and after this period Anti-Christ shall be born in Ispahan. Hear what I am going to say about the destruction of the followers of Anti-Christ. For this purpose Jesus and the last Apostles will appear.'

welcomed with joy the ultimate restoration of British government. Moreover, the Native States remained staunch. It is true that certain minor Chiefs joined the rebellion, but the leading Princes of India were steadfast in their allegiance to the British Crown. Thus the principal assistance given to the rebel Sepoys came from a small number of disaffected nobles and deposed officials, who in their turn found support only from the lawless and restless spirits of their neighbourhoods, no longer restrained by a powerful government.

The Mutiny was thus primarily a military rising, aided and abetted to a limited extent by a proportion of the hereditary criminal classes. It was a rising, moreover, confined in great measure to the Sepoys of the Bengal Regular Army. For many years prior to the outbreak these men had shown a bad spirit, to be attributed in part to discontent at changes affecting the condition of their service, and in part to pampering and lax discipline. The discipline of this Army had in fact been weakened by an encouragement to Sepoys to make frivolous complaints to head-quarters, and to think lightly of the authority of those over them. At the same time there had been a marked deterioration in the character of their regimental officers, while the inefficiency of not a few officers of higher rank in command of divisions and districts completed the evil. At this particular juncture, moreover, the proportion of British to Native troops in India was dangerously small. The warnings

given by Lord Dalhousie had been neglected; and owing to the paucity of European troops the principal arsenals and military posts of India, notably that of Delhi, were garrisoned by disaffected Sepoys¹.

Under such conditions only a touch was needed to change insubordination into revolt. It was heedlessly applied. The adoption of the Enfield Rifle for use in the Native Army seemed an innocent measure; but a cry of 'greased cartridges' was raised, and the long-suppressed agitation burst into active life. Greased cartridges were no novelty. They had been sent out to India some years before the Mutiny, they had been subsequently manufactured by native hands in local arsenals, and had been issued without objection to certain Sepoy troops. But this time it was reported, and not without foundation, that the grease was made of hog's lard or cow's fat (a contamination to Hindus and Muhammadans alike), and the clamour spread far and wide. Everywhere it was proclaimed that the Native Army was thus to be forced into the Christian faith. The agitators hailed the grievance with delight. The Government made weak explanations. The mischief was done.

¹ The number of European troops in the Bengal Presidency was at this time unusually small. Two cavalry regiments had been withdrawn for service in the Crimea and not replaced; and four infantry regiments were absent with the Persian expeditionary force. The bulk of the remainder were quartered in the Punjab. Oudh was guarded by only one weak British regiment; while Delhi with its vast magazine was, as above said, entrusted entirely to Bengal Sepoys.

The Mutiny now became a fact, notwithstanding the indignant protestations of officers who sacrificed their lives to the mistaken conviction that their men were faithful. Leaders were soon forthcoming in the persons of Bahádur Sháh (the titular King of Delhi) and others who had long watched for an opportunity; and many parts of India were quickly plunged into a chaos of confusion and bloodshed. Little need be said in regard to the leaders. There were only three of any note. The titular King of Delhi resided with his family in the old palace of the Mughals at Delhi, whence his sons had travelled freely for many years throughout the country, stirring up hopes of a revived Muhammadan Empire. The Rání of Jhánsí, Ganga Báí, had become a bitter enemy of the English on account of the annexation of the principality after the death of her husband without an heir. The Náná Sáhib, Dundhu Panth, an adopted son of a deposed Maráthá Peshwá, although permitted to inherit his adoptive father's personal property, including the estate of Bithúr near Cawnpur, had been refused a lapsed pension, and he now became one of the most infamous and active leaders of the rebellion ¹.

¹ In connection with this subject, it may not be out of place to quote the opinion of Sir Hugh Rose who, writing home in October, 1857, said, before the more careful subsequent enquiries :—

‘The more events unroll themselves the more they seem to show that the revolt in India was not *purely* a military one, but that the origin of the trouble was *in some degree* an outcome of a political conspiracy, at the head of which were the King of Delhi, the King of Oudh, and Náná Sáhib, all three candidates for kingdoms.’

Sir Hugh Rose's view, expressed in the heat of the operations,

With the Náná Sáhib was associated the only military commander of any distinction on the rebel side. Tántia Topi had been brought up in the household of the deposed Peshwá, and regarded the Náná, the Peshwá's adopted son, as a master whose cause he was bound to champion. He had all the qualities of a general except daring; for although he led his troops well more than once, he was chiefly remarkable for his retreat after the capture of Gwalior, in June 1858, when for the space of nine months he eluded the vigilance of the forces sent to capture him, covering as much as 3000 miles in his flight.

It may be of interest to the general reader to call to mind certain views expressed by one of the most eminent contemporary authorities on the events of this period.

'The annexation of Oudh,' said Lord Lawrence, speaking at Glasgow in 1860, 'had nothing to do with the Mutiny in the first place, though that measure certainly did add to the number of our enemies after the Mutiny commenced. The old government of Oudh was extremely obnoxious to the mass of our native soldiers of the regular army, who came from Oudh and the adjacent province of Behar, and with whom the Mutiny originated. These men were the sons and kinsmen of the Hindu yeomen of the country, all of whom benefited more or less by annexation; while Oudh was ruled by a Muhammadan should, however, be corrected by Lord Lawrence's deliberate and authoritative decision, after considering the whole evidence.

family which had never identified itself with the people, and whose government was extremely oppressive to all classes except its immediate creatures and followers. But when the introduction of the greased cartridges had excited the Native Army to revolt, when the mutineers saw nothing before them short of escape on the one hand or destruction on the other, they, and all who sympathised with them, were driven to the most desperate measures. All who could be influenced by love or fear rallied round them. All who had little or nothing to lose joined their ranks. All that dangerous class of religious fanatics and devotees who abound in India, all the political intriguers, who in peaceful times can do no mischief, swelled the numbers of the enemy, and gave spirit and direction to their measures. India is full of races of men, who, from time immemorial, have lived by service or by plunder, and who are ready to join in any disturbance which may promise them employment. Oudh was full of disbanded soldiers who had not had time to settle down. Our gaols furnished thousands of desperate men let loose on society. The cry throughout the country as cantonment after cantonment became the scene of triumphant mutiny was, "The English rule is at an end. Let us plunder and enjoy ourselves." The industrious classes throughout India were on our side, but for a long time feared to act. On the one side they saw the few English in the country shot down or flying for their lives, or at the best standing on the defensive, sorely pressed; on

the other side they saw summary punishment, in the shape of the plunder and destruction of their houses, dealt out to those who aided us. But when we evinced signs of vigour, when we began to assume the offensive and vindicate our authority, many of these people came forward and identified themselves with our cause.'

No clearer outline could be given of the causes and effects of the Mutiny. The shock was a terrible one, but it left British power in India more firmly established than ever. Foes and friends rose up where their appearance was least expected. And one lesson will ever be indelibly engraved on the pages of its history, namely, that while the Native Princes of India whom we mistrusted brought their armies and influence to our aid, the Sepoy troops on whom we relied turned against us. From the day when this experience was taken to heart dates the consolidation of our Indian Empire as it now exists.

CHAPTER II

THE OUTBREAK

WHEN Lord Dalhousie gave up his post in the early part of 1856, he publicly warned the English in India that 'cruel violence might be suddenly committed by men who up to the last moment had been regarded as harmless, even by those who knew them best.' Lord Canning, at a farewell banquet given to him by the Court of Directors, when he was leaving for Calcutta as the new Governor-General, also said: 'I wish for a peaceful term of office. But I cannot forget that in the sky of India, serene as it is, a small cloud may arise no larger than a man's hand, but which growing larger and larger may at last threaten to burst and overwhelm us with ruin.' Warnings to Government had not been wanting, moreover, from experienced observers who had watched for some time the growth of discontent in the Bengal Sepoy Army. At length the storm burst. And if the fearful disasters, the touching incidents, and the memorable exploits which belong to the first few months of the outbreak are too briefly summed up in this chapter, it is because the object of the volume admits only of such passing reference to them as may carry on the reader intelli-

gently to the military operations connected with the final suppression of the revolt by Sir Colin Campbell and Sir Hugh Rose.

Preceded in various parts of India, as already seen, by indications of a mutinous spirit in the Native Army, a spirit of disaffection that grew stronger as it was met with increasing indecision, the first important outbreak of the Sepoys took place on May 10th, 1857, at Meerut. The Native troops at that place rose in open rebellion; and although there were only about 2700 Sepoys with 1700 Europeans to control them, the mutineers, without check or hindrance, released a number of desperate prisoners from the jail, set fire to the cantonments, and hurried away unmolested to Delhi. There, amid fearful scenes of murder and carnage, the titular King of Delhi was set up as Sovereign Lord of Hindustán. Within a few short hours not a vestige remained in the city of British authority except the Arsenal; and this building, after being defended for a time by a small and devoted band of Englishmen¹ who watched in vain for succour from Meerut, had at length to be blown up to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. The first great step in the Mutiny was thus accomplished in a few hours. 'Onwards to Delhi' was now the cry, and the old Mughal capital became the

¹ Lieutenant George Willoughby of the Bengal Artillery, Lieutenants Forest and Raynor, Conductors Buckley, Shaw, and Kelly, Sub-Conductor Crow, and Sergeants Edwards and Stuart, were the nine heroes of the Delhi arsenal. Of these, three only lived to tell the tale.

political centre of the rebellion. On our part everything depended on energy and resolution. 'Where have we failed,' wrote John Lawrence to the Commander-in-Chief, 'when we have acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timid counsels? Clive with his 1200 men fought at Plassey in opposition to the advice of his leading officers, beat 40,000 men and conquered Bengal. Monson retreated from the Chambal, and before he gained Agra, his army was disorganised and partially annihilated.' A picked force from Meerut and Ambála, acting with vigour and operating from both sides of the Jumna, would in all probability have recovered the possession of the city by a *coup de main*. But it was not so to be. A few days of inactivity allowed the flame to blaze up beyond possibility of immediate extinction. The unchallenged occupation of the Mughal capital by rebel sepoys and *badmashes* was followed by risings and massacres in almost every station within range of the example; and from Firozpur, Bareilly, Moradábád, Sháhjahánpur, Cawnpur, and numerous other places came harrowing tales of massacre, suffering, and heroism.

When this terrible news reached army headquarters, it was received with a perhaps natural incredulity. Nevertheless, a force was hastily assembled at Ambála; and with the troops thus mobilised, General Anson, then Commander-in-Chief, made preparations to march against the renowned city of the Mughal. The little force had hardly started, however,

when its leader died of cholera (May 27th). It was not until the 1st of June that General Barnard, who had succeeded temporarily to the chief command, advanced in earnest against the now jubilant rebels. Meanwhile, a small body of troops under Brigadier Archdale Wilson marched out from Meerut, after a disastrous delay; and the combined force, amounting to about 3000 Europeans and one battalion of Gúrkhas, fought its way onwards till it reached the outskirts of the city on the 8th of June, 1857.

We may now refer to the three great points—Delhi, Cawnpur, and Lucknow, round which the Mutiny was, so to speak, centred during the earlier period of the revolt; namely, from May 1857, till the arrival in India of Sir Colin Campbell in August of that year.

The modern city of Delhi was founded by the Emperor Sháh Jehán in 1631. Situated on the right bank of a branch of the Jumna river it was, as it still is, surrounded by a high wall some seven miles in extent, strengthened by bastions and by a capacious dry ditch. The British force held the elevated ground known as the Ridge, which extends two miles along the northern and western faces of the city—a position taken up some centuries before by Timúr Sháh and his Tartar hordes when advancing to attack old Delhi. At intervals along the Ridge stood the Flagstaff Tower, the Observatory, a large mansion called Hindu Ráo's house, and other defensible buildings. The space between the city and the Ridge was thickly planted, for the most part with trees and shrubs; in the midst

of which might be seen numerous mosques and large houses, and the ruins of older buildings. It soon became evident that the position held by the British force on the Ridge was a false one; and the question arose whether the city might not be taken by a *coup de main*, seeing that it was impossible either to invest it or to attempt a regular siege with any chance of success. A plan of assault, to be carried out on the 12th of June, was drawn up by a young Engineer officer and sanctioned. Had this assault been delivered the city would in all likelihood have been taken and held. For there were not more than about 7000 Sepoys within the walls, while the available British troops numbered 2000; and since the numerical discrepancy between the contending forces was no less in proportion when the stronghold was finally captured, we may not unfairly assume that the columns detailed for the contemplated operations of the 12th of June might have succeeded as well as those which made the actual assault three months later. But owing to a series of accidents, the plan fell through—a miscarriage the more to be regretted because the early recapture of the city would in all human probability have put a stop to further outbreaks.

As matters stood, however, the gallant little force before Delhi could barely hold its own. It was an army of observation perpetually harassed by an active enemy. As time went on, therefore, the question of raising the siege in favour of a movement towards

Agra was more than once seriously discussed, but was fortunately abandoned. On July 5th, 1857, General Barnard died, worn out with fatigue and anxiety. He was succeeded in command by General Archdale Wilson, an officer who, possessing no special force of character, did little more than secure the safe defence of the position until the arrival of Brigadier Nicholson from the Punjab, August 14th, 1857¹, with a moveable column of 2500 men, European and Sikhs. And here we may leave Delhi for the moment, deferring till later any further details of the siege.

The city of Cawnpur, situated on the south bank of the river Ganges, forty-two miles south-west of Lucknow and 270 miles from Delhi, lies about a mile from the river in a large sandy plain. On the strip of land between the river and the town, a space broken by ravines, stretched the Civil Station and cantonments. A more difficult position to hold in an extremity cannot well be conceived, occupied as it was by four disaffected Sepoy regiments with but sixty European artillerymen to overawe them. There was, moreover, an incompetent commander. Realising after the disasters at Meerut and Delhi that his native garrison was not to be trusted, Sir Hugh Wheeler threw up a make-shift entrenchment close to the Sepoy lines. Commanded on all sides, it was

¹ Sir Colin Campbell had arrived at Calcutta from England on the previous day.

totally unfitted to stand a siege. But a worse mistake was to follow. Alarmed as time went on at his growing difficulties, Sir Hugh Wheeler at length asked the notorious Náná Sahib, who lived a few miles off at Bithúr, to assist him with troops to guard the Treasury. For some months previously this arch-traitor's emissaries had been spreading discontent throughout India, but he himself had taken care to remain on good terms with his European neighbours. He now saw his opportunity. Cawnpur, delivered into his hands by the misplaced confidence of its defenders, was virtually in his keeping. Of European succour there was no immediate hope. The place was doomed. The crash came three days before General Barnard's force reached Delhi. With the exception of a few devoted natives who remained faithful to their salt, the whole Sepoy force on the 5th of June rose in revolt, opened the doors of the jail, robbed the treasury, and made themselves masters of the magazine. The Náná cast aside all further pretence of friendship and, joined by the mutinous troops, laid siege to the entrenchment already mentioned, which with culpable military ignorance had been thrown up in one of the worst positions that could have been chosen.

The besieging army numbered some 3000 men. The besieged could only muster about 400 English soldiers, more than 70 of which number were invalids. For twenty-one days the little garrison suffered untold horrors from starvation, heat, and the

onslaughts of the rebels; until the General in command listened to overtures for surrender, and the garrison marched out on the 27th of June, to the number of about 450 souls, provided with a promise of safeguard from the Náná, who would allow them, as they thought, to embark in country boats for Allahábád. Tántia Topi, who afterwards became notorious in Central India, superintended the embarkation. No sooner, however, were the Europeans placed in the boats, in apparent safety, than a battery of guns concealed on the river banks opened fire, while at the same time a deadly fusillade of musketry was poured on the luckless refugees. The Náná at length ordered the massacre to cease. He celebrated what he called his glorious victory by proclaiming himself Peshwá or Maráthá Sovereign, and by rewarding his troops for their 'splendid achievements,' while the wretched survivors of his treachery, numbering about 5 men and 206 women and children, were taken back to Cawnpur and confined in a small building for further vengeance and insult.

On the 15th of July came the last act of this tragedy. The Náná, having suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Brigadier Havelock's force within a day's march of Cawnpur, as will presently be recorded, put the whole of his prisoners to death. The men were brought out and killed in his presence, while the women and children were hacked to pieces by Muhammadan butchers and others in their prison.

Their bodies were thrown into what is now known as the 'Cawnpur Well.'

Lucknow, at the time of the Mutiny, was in population, in extent, and in the number and importance of its principal buildings, one of the foremost cities of India. Situated on the river Gúmti, its beautiful palaces, mosques and public buildings, many of which soon became famous, rose in stately array from a maze of long narrow streets. The Residency stood on a hill gently sloping towards the river, and was an imposing edifice of three stories. Near it were the iron and stone bridges over the river. The southern and eastern quarters of the city were bounded by a canal which crossed the road leading to Cawnpur, and finally reached the Gúmti.

At the outbreak of the Mutiny the Sepoy regiments were stationed in various localities within the city; while the 32nd Foot, the only European regiment on the spot, was quartered in a barrack about a mile or so from the Residency. As was the case elsewhere, so it happened at Lucknow. While the population and native garrison were seething with sedition, the British authorities were hampered by ignorance of popular feeling, by the want of European troops, and by divided counsels. So, by the end of May, 1857, the rebellion in Oudh became an accomplished fact, although matters went on with comparative smoothness in Lucknow itself. At length, after a serious disaster at Chinhat, the British garrison was forced

to withdraw to the Residency and its adjacent buildings; and on the 1st of July commenced the famous investment of this position by the rebel forces.

The position was ill adapted for defence; for the lofty windows of the Residency itself not only allowed free access to the enemy's missiles, but its roof was wholly exposed. On the opposite side of the street, leading from the Bailey Guard Gate, was the house of the Residency Surgeon¹, Dr. (now Sir Joseph) Fayrer. It was a large but not lofty building with a flat roof which, protected by sand bags, afforded a good cover for our riflemen, and with a *tyekhana*, or underground story that afforded good shelter for the women and children. But as a whole, the defences of the Residency were more formidable in name than in reality, and were greatly weakened by the proximity of high buildings from which the rebels without danger to themselves poured an unceasing fire.

The siege had an ominous commencement. On July 4th the much-beloved Sir Henry Lawrence, the Resident, died of a wound received two days before from an enemy's shell that had fallen into his room. Brigadier Inglis succeeded him in command; and for three months the heroic garrison of about 1700 souls held their weak position, amid inconceivable hardships and dangers, against thousands of the rebels who were constantly reinforced by fresh

¹ It is impossible to speak too highly of the services of this distinguished officer then and since. His name is a household word in India.

levies. It was well said in a general order by Lord Canning that there could not be found in the annals of war an achievement more heroic than this defence, which had exhibited in the highest degree a noble and sustained courage, which against enormous odds and fearful disadvantages, against hope deferred and through unceasing toil and wear of body and mind, still held on day after day and triumphed.

Having thus glanced at the more prominent features and centres of the Mutiny, between May and August, 1857, some reference must be made to Brigadier Havelock's first campaign of June and July of that eventful year. At the outbreak of the revolt few soldiers in India had seen more active service than Henry Havelock. 'He was the man of greatest military culture then in India. He was a veteran of war, very few of whose contemporaries had seen so much fighting. In Burma he had been in the field from Rangoon to Pagan. He had taken part in hill warfare in the passes of Khurd Kábul, and Jugdulluk. He had graduated in sortie-leading and defence work as a prominent member of the illustrious garrison of Jalálábád. At Mahárájpur he had helped to beat a Maráthá army; at Múdkí, Firozsháh, and Sobráon he had fought against the old battalions of the Khalsa in the full flush of warlike pride. The dust of his Persian campaign was still in the crevices of his sword hilt¹.' His religious enthusiasm was bound-

¹ *Havelock*, by Archibald Forbes.

less; and although reserved and unbending in manner, he was respected by all who served under him. If he had a human passion it was to command a force in the field.

On arriving at Bombay in the latter part of May, 1857, from the Persian expedition, he heard the astounding news of the disasters at Meerut and Delhi. Unable to start for Delhi by the land route, he proceeded to Calcutta by sea, and shortly after his arrival in Bengal received the command he so much desired. Eight days later, he left Calcutta, charged with the relief of Cawnpur and Lucknow. 'After quelling all disturbances at Allahábád,' his orders said, 'he should lose not a moment in supporting Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow and Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawnpur, and he should take prompt measures for dispersing all mutineers and insurgents.'

On June 30th, or three days after the massacre of the Cawnpur garrison at the Gháts, he reached Allahábád, where Colonel Neill had been employed in organising the preparations for an advance on Cawnpur. Leaving Allahábád on the 7th of July at the head of about 1500 European troops, he reached Fatehpur by forced marches, defeating a large body of the enemy there and capturing eleven guns without the loss of a single British soldier. On July 16th he arrived at the outskirts of Cawnpur, turned the enemy's flank by a clever and rapid movement, and obtained virtual possession of the town after hard

fighting; only to find, as already narrated, that the Náná on the previous day had butchered in cold blood all his helpless prisoners. To add to his sorrows the news reached him, on the day he entered Cawnpur, of the death of Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow.

By this time, the difficulties that beset Havelock's advance on Lucknow were becoming insuperable. The British ranks had been thinned not only in fight but by sickness; and it was plain that the task assigned to him was one of unforeseen magnitude. The first attempt was a complete failure; but five days afterwards (July 20th), Neill arrived from Allahábád, and Havelock made a fresh endeavour to advance on Lucknow. Crossing the Ganges into Oudh, he successfully encountered the enemy at Unao; but although within thirty-eight miles of his destination, cholera, fatigue, and exposure had made such inroads on his sadly reduced force that he was compelled once more to fall back on Cawnpur. Twice again did the gallant little force advance, but on each occasion had to fall back; and thus terminated Havelock's first campaign for the relief of Lucknow. He had fought five actions against an enemy greatly superior in numbers, only to find that although he could gain victories he could not follow them up.

And now his wearied and exhausted troops enjoyed a month's rest at Cawnpur, full of disappointment at the result; while further preparations were made for the next move in relief of the beleagured garrison of the Lucknow Residency.

Writing some years afterwards (November 30th, 1860), Sir Hugh Rose said :—

‘I am now with the camp on the march to Lucknow, and going over the scene of Sir H. Havelock’s successive advances from Cawnpur to Lucknow. It is very interesting, and the more so because I have an officer with me who was with him. Too much praise cannot be given to him. He had the greatest difficulties to contend with, the rain came down in torrents, the country was flooded so that he could scarcely move his artillery off the roads. And besides his losses from the enemy, his men were carried off by dysentery and cholera, in consequence of their having no tents and being exposed to all the inclemency of the weather, with insufficient food and very hard work.’

CHAPTER III

THE SITUATION

WE have endeavoured in the previous pages to indicate the progress of affairs in the North-West of India from the first outbreak of the Mutiny up to the date of Sir Colin Campbell's arrival at Calcutta (August 13th, 1857). So unforeseen was the storm, that for a time few realised its import and extent. In fact, as late as June 23rd, 1857 (the centenary of Plassey), the perfect serenity of the Indian sky formed the subject of general comment in London, both in leading journals and at political meetings; although at that very moment, unknown to the British public, Delhi was in the hands of rebels, Oudh was in mutiny, and British power in the North-West was only represented within the range of the guns and rifles of scattered detachments of troops. But when England at last awoke to the facts, the nation made one of those characteristic efforts which have so often marked her progress. Within a few weeks, 30,000 men of all arms were on the high-road to India.

In that country itself anarchy and confusion pre-

vailed in its most vulnerable parts. The besieging force before Delhi could do little more than hold its own. The small band of heroes defending the Residency at Lucknow was closely invested and sore beset; while, harassed by sickness amongst his troops and by losses in the field, Havelock had been compelled to abandon for the moment all hope of relieving the place. Communications throughout the country were interrupted. The action of the responsible authorities, at one time vacillating and at another distinguished by attempts to preserve some show of authority, was more or less futile. Agra was invested by mutineers from Nímach. Allahábád was in danger. Cawnpur was lost and regained by turns. And in the North-West Provinces generally there was little else to record than local risings, murders of refugees, and general disorder. In Bengal Proper, the Province of Behar was chiefly infected. Its districts were overrun by the rebel landholder, Koer Singh; while some of its principal towns were the scenes of massacre and plunder, only relieved by glorious achievements of British courage.

Three Sepoy regiments, for instance, quartered at Dinápur, a place situated about 220 miles from Calcutta, mutinied and surrounded the civil station of Arrah, to the south-west of it. For a whole week (July, 1857) Arrah was held by two civilians, Messrs. Wake and Boyle, with a small band of Sikhs and English refugees. Besieged in an open bungalow, they fought against upwards of 3000 rebels, until on August 2nd,

Major (afterwards Sir) Vincent Eyre effected their relief with a force of 200 men; an exploit which, like the defence, will bear comparison with the finest achievements of the time. 'The rout of the rebels was complete, and the road to Arrah was left as clear as though there had been no mutiny at Dinápur, no revolt in Behar.'

Notwithstanding such exceptional episodes, there was little to relieve the prevailing gloom in Bengal; for the districts immediately in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, and even the Presidency town itself, had not only been subject to serious panics but had witnessed instances of weakness and indecision on our part which may well be left unrecorded.

In Madras matters remained comparatively quiet. When the outbreak occurred, the military resources of the Southern Presidency were seriously reduced by the absence on service in Persia of the greater part of its European regiments, although the previous proportion of European to Native troops was smaller than it had been since the beginning of the century. There were barely five European infantry and one cavalry corps, distributed by wings at various places, to protect this large and important part of India. Considerations of a political nature increased the anxiety caused by military weakness. In Nágpur, only lately annexed, there were many persons of influence who were disaffected. Haidarábád was a source of grave anxiety; while within British territory the Muhammadans of Karnúl, Cuddapah, and Malabar were greatly excited by

the proclamation of a Muhammadan Empire at Delhi. From many quarters came rumours of plots and treasonable preparations. Seditious emissaries and Sepoy deserters entered the Presidency in large numbers, with the object of tampering with the army and of exciting disloyalty towards the Government. But it is satisfactory to record that their evil purpose was not fulfilled. With one solitary exception, the conduct of the Madras Native Army furnished an example of loyalty and fidelity, during this time of trial, which did it infinite honour. While, therefore, a considerable portion of these troops were employed in the thick of the fight in Oudh, in Bengal, and in Central India, it was nowhere necessary to call, within the limits of the Madras Presidency, for their active services.

In Bombay the Government had to deal with somewhat more turbulent races, and local risings took place at points within the Presidency. Here, as elsewhere, however, the Native Princes and States were generally conspicuous for their fidelity. The peace of Káthiáwár for instance—a country containing 188 separate States and as large as Greece—was preserved without the presence of a single European soldier. Moreover, although the mutinous spirit which infected the Sepoys of Bengal was also exhibited under one form or another in the Western Presidency, its progress was promptly checked. To the judgment and resolution of Lord Elphinstone, and to the energy, discretion, and vigilance of his lieutenants, was due the safety of this vital part of India; so that

Bombay was able to afford material assistance to her hard beset neighbours in the north, and yet to take care of herself. It is true that the Bombay Native Army could not rival the fidelity of that of Madras; for the Bombay Sepoys had been to a certain extent recruited from Oudh and Behar, and were tainted with disaffection. Nevertheless, instances of overt mutiny were exceptional, while it is a significant fact that the Presidency authorities had sufficient confidence in their Native Army as to increase its numbers. Moreover, Bombay was able to organise an efficient military transport, and to procure from various places, within a short time, many thousand horses of all kinds for general use in the campaign. Unfortunately for the Western Presidency, the withdrawal of a large portion of its army for service in the Persian expedition had necessitated the occupation of certain places within its limits by Bengal Sepoys, whose mutinous conduct disturbed the peace and afforded a dangerous example to their fellow-soldiers.

Although the Punjab was a comparatively new province of British India, bordered on one side by tribes of wild, fanatical hill-men, and itself inhabited by a warlike people sorely tempted to take advantage of existing difficulties, yet in the hands of such officers as Lawrence, Montgomery and others, the country west of the Sutlej remained for the most part tranquil during the progress of the rebellion. Moreover, although about 36,000 Sepoys, recruited from Oudh and Behar, were scattered in various stations through

this province, there were within its limits fortunately about 10,000 European troops, besides a trustworthy force of 9000 military police, to overawe them. Happily also, for India, the self-reliance and varied experience of the civil and military officers of the Punjab enabled them to realise, sooner than the authorities in other parts of India, the gravity of the public danger.

John Lawrence and his lieutenants allowed neither sentiment nor fear of responsibility to stand in the way of instant and resolute activity. Offences touching the public safety were punished summarily with death. Strong parties of police were placed in defensible positions at the principal ferries of the 'Punjab,' or 'five rivers,' which cut off the province from Hindustán. All State treasure was placed in security. A strict censorship was maintained over the press; and letters to Sepoys¹ were opened at the chief post-offices. The population in the Cis- and Trans-Indus territory was disarmed, and fines were promptly inflicted on villages and townships for local outbreaks. The prisoners in jail were employed in making cartridges, sand-bags, and commissariat gear, for the troops operating before Delhi. In short, everywhere in the Punjab an example was set, which can never be forgotten,

¹ The seditious papers thus discovered were generally couched in figurative or enigmatical language. They yield ample evidence that the Sepoys and other rebels verily believed that the destruction of their caste and religion was intended by the English, and that the moment for rising was a favourable one. All this was made manifest in letters never intended for European eyes.

of courage, energy, and far-sightedness in time of peril.

The Chiefs of Patiála, Jind, Nábha, Kapúrthala, and other Sikh States came forward, moreover, with offers of military assistance; and not only provided guards for English ladies in out-stations, but assisted materially in the siege of Delhi and in the subsequent re-occupation of the disturbed territory surrounding that city. Beyond the Punjab border the Amír of Afghánistán, Dost Muhammad, although urged by his advisers to invade India with 20,000 Afgháns, refused to do so, stoutly declaring that he sympathised with the British authorities in their misfortunes and would be faithful to his alliance.

There is not the least doubt but that the Hindustání troops in the Punjab wanted only means and opportunity to side with their fellow Sepoys in lower India. Serious risings, promptly suppressed, took place at Firozpur, Pesháwar, Jálandhar, Jehlam, Siálkot, Meean Meer, and other places. Yet, in spite of dangers and anxiety near at hand, the reinforcement of the little army before Delhi was an object of paramount importance with the Punjab authorities. The first body of troops despatched from the province was that which accompanied General Anson in his march towards Delhi. Then further large reinforcements followed. Some 300 artillerymen of the old Sikh army were also enlisted for our service; and with a newly-raised Sapper and Miner company of Sikhs, 1200 strong, and a body of

Punjábi horse, these men were sent to the same destination; while wagon-trains were organised to convey troops, stores, and material to the besieging force. It was, arranged, moreover, that the contingents of the Mahárájá of Patiála, and the Rájás of Jind and Nábha—in all 7000 men—should co-operate with our troops, and that an irregular force numbering about 1000 men under General Van Courtland, formerly in Ranjít Singh's service, should clear the western part of the Delhi territory. Subsequently, when only 6000 Europeans (half of them locked up in the Pesháwar Valley and prostrated by fever), remained behind to keep in check the fierce tribes of the North-West Frontier and the thousands of armed and disarmed Sepoys, the last available white troops were sent to Delhi under Colonel Nicholson, leaving only about 4000 European soldiers to hold the province. The die was finally cast. The supreme effort had been made. Thenceforward on the capture of Delhi depended the existence of the Punjab as a British possession.

The following table shows in chronological order the dates of the principal actions and events which this volume endeavours to describe.

Date.	Northern Operations.	Southern Operations.
1857. 10 May.	Outbreak at Meerut and seizure of Delhi by the rebels on the 12th idem, followed by risings in the Punjab, Bengal, and elsewhere.	

Date.	Northern Operations.	Southern Operations.
1857. 30 May.	General Mutiny at Lucknow.	
5 June.	Mutiny at Cawnpur.	
8 June.	Arrival of British force before Delhi.	
27 June.	Massacre by Náná Sáhib of the Cawnpur garrison when embarking in boats for Allahábád under promise of safe conduct.	
1 July.	Siege of Lucknow Residency by rebels after our reverse at Chinhát on 29th of June, followed on 4th July by the death of Sir Henry Lawrence.	
15 July.	Massacre by Náná Sáhib of the remainder of Cawnpur garrison and others, viz. 5 men and 206 women and children ; their corpses thrown into the 'Cawnpur Well.'	
29 July to Aug. 16.	Havelock having reached Cawnpur on 16th of July, moves on to the relief of Lucknow, but after a series of severe actions is obliged to fall back again on Cawnpur.	
2 Aug.	Relief of Arrah by Eyre.	
17 Aug.	Sir Colin Campbell having reached Calcutta on the 13th inst. assumes chief command of the army.	
14 Sept.	Assault and capture of Delhi, which is completely occupied by British troops on the 20th inst.	
25 Sept.	First relief of Lucknow by Havelock, who remained with Residency garrison.	
27 Oct.	Sir Colin Campbell leaves Calcutta for the front.	
16 Nov.	Second relief of Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell, followed by withdrawal	

Date.	Northern Operations.	Southern Operations.
1857.	of garrison from Residency and death of Sir Henry Havelock at Alam-bágh on 24th inst. General interregnum till March, 1858.	
1858.		
16 Jan.		Advance of Sir Hugh Rose from Mhow and capture of Rathgarh on 28th inst.
3 Feb.		Relief of Ságar garrison.
13 Feb.		Capture of Garhákota fort.
3 Mar.		Forcing of Mundingpur Pass and occupation of Bundelkhand, followed by capture of fort of Chandari on 17th inst.
14 Mar.	Siege and capture of Lucknow, followed by complete occupation on 20th inst. after a series of operations dating from 8th inst.	
30 Mar.		Taking of Kotah in Rájputána (by Roberts).
3 April.		Storm and capture of Jhānsí preceded by action of Betwá on 1st inst. against 25,000 rebels under Tántia Topi.
19 April.		Occupation of Bānda (Whitlock).
6 May.	Bareilly re-occupied by Sir Colin Campbell.	Action of Kúnch.
23 May.		Capture of Kálpi after a series of operations.
17 June.		Seizure by rebels of Gwalior, and deposition of Mahárájá Sindhia.
20 June.		Recapture of Gwalior by Sir Hugh Rose. Central India Field Force now broken up.
2 Aug.	Transfer of East India Company to Crown, followed	

Date.	Northern Operations.	Southern Operations.
1858.	by Queen's Proclamation on 1st November.	
1 to 30 Nov.	Further operations in Oudh under Sir Colin Campbell.	
1859. 7 April.		Tántia Topi captured in South-Western India and hanged on 18th April.
Oct. to Dec.	Final operations against rebels in Northern Oudh and Nepál, and capture in December of 4000 of Náná Sáhí's adherents by a force (20th Regt. and detachments) under Brigadier (afterwards Sir Edward) Holdich.	

CHAPTER IV

THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS TO THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW

‘WHEN will you be ready to start?’ said Lord Panmure to Sir Colin Campbell, as he offered him the chief command in India in succession to General Anson. ‘To-morrow,’ replied the war-worn veteran; and on the morrow accordingly (July 12th, 1857), he left London, saying that he would get his outfit in Calcutta. Thus started the new Commander-in-Chief at the age of sixty-five, with all the readiness and ardour of a young soldier.

Colin Macliver, better known as Colin Campbell, was born at Glasgow on the 20th of October, 1792. Entering the army in 1808 as Colin Campbell, which name he took from his mother’s family, he served with distinction in the Peninsular War and with the Walcheren expedition. He led a forlorn hope at the storming of San Sebastian, and was greatly distinguished in his earlier, as in his later career, for personal gallantry. ‘I hereby certify,’ says an official memorandum signed by Lord Lynedoch, ‘that Captain Colin Campbell, then Lieutenant of the 9th Foot, under my command, behaved with the utmost gallantry and

intrepidity at the storming of the convent-redoubt in advance of San Sebastian, and afterwards at the assault of that fortress, on both which occasions he was severely wounded; also in the action near Irun, at the forcing of the enemy from their strong position on the Bidasoa, on the 7th of October, 1813.' In order to take part in the last-named fight, young Campbell had left hospital, his wounds still unhealed, without leave; for which breach of discipline he was severely reprimanded, being given to understand that the offence would have met with a heavier punishment but for his conduct in the field. Some years later, when Sir Charles Napier presented new colours to the 98th Regiment, he referred in glowing terms to Colin Campbell's exploits in the Peninsula. After reading to the men an account of the storming of San Sebastian he said:—'There stands Lieutenant Campbell'—who was now a Lieutenant-Colonel—'and well I know that, should need be, the soldiers of the 98th would follow him as boldly as did those gallant men of the glorious 9th who fell fighting around him in the breaches of San Sebastian.'

Although he had reached the rank of Captain in five years it was nearly thirty before Colin Campbell attained his Colonelcy. During this interval and afterwards he served in the American War of 1814, in the West Indies, in the China War of 1842; and, afterwards, in the second Sikh War of 1848-49, which latter campaign gained him the honour of a K.C.B., as well as high praise for 'steady coolness and military

precision.' Referring to the Sikh War, he wrote: 'I had the good fortune to be employed and present in every affair in which there was anything to do during the late campaign, including the pursuit of Dost Muhammad and his Afgháns to the Kháibar Pass.' The notification of his promotion to a Knight Commandership of the Bath was conveyed to him in a letter from Sir Charles Napier, who said 'no man has won it better.'

At this period of his career the great wish in Colin Campbell's mind was to return to England and retire from the service, since he was now in a position to 'save his family from privation.' 'I am growing old and only fit for retirement,' he wrote in his journal on October 20th, 1849. 'I neither care,' he said to Sir Hope Grant, 'nor do I desire, for anything else but the little money in the shape of *batta* to make the road between the camp and the grave a little smoother than I could otherwise make it out of the profession. For I long to have the little time that may remain to me to myself, away from barracks and regimental or professional life, with the duties that belong to it in peace.' Persuaded, however, to remain a few years longer in India, he was employed for a while in the harassing work of a frontier post and in operations against the hill tribes of the Afghán border. He returned to England in the early part of 1853; but it was not to enjoy the repose to which he had been looking forward so earnestly.

In 1854, on the outbreak of the Crimean War, Sir

Colin Campbell was offered, and accepted, the command of what was afterwards known as the 'Highland Brigade.' It was he, it has been said, who secured the victory of the Alma. Leading his Highlanders against a redoubt which had been retaken by the enemy, after being carried by our Light Division, he succeeded in breaking the last compact columns of the Russians. 'The 42nd continued its advance,' he wrote in a letter to Colonel H. Vincent, 'followed as I had previously ordered, by the other two regiments (93rd and 79th) in *échelon*, forming in that order as they gained in succession the summit of the left bank of the Alma. On gaining the height, we found the enemy, who had retreated from the redoubt, attempting to form upon two large masses of troops that were advancing over the plateau to meet the attack of the 42nd. The men were too much blown to think of charging, so they opened fire advancing in line, at which they had been practised, and drove with cheers and a terrible loss both masses and the fugitives from the redoubt in confusion before them. . . . The Guards during these operations were away to my right, and quite removed from the scene of this fight which I have described. It was a fight of the Highland Brigade.' When the fight was over and Lord Raglan sent for him, he begged that he might be allowed as a special favour to wear the Highland bonnet, instead of the cocked hat of a general officer, throughout the remainder of the campaign; 'which pleased the men,' he wrote, 'very much.'

During the latter part of the Crimean campaign, Sir Colin Campbell, now a Major-General, was placed in charge of the position at Balaclava. His biographer¹ tells us that even 'in the worst times of that weary winter, the experienced old soldier had never taken a desponding view of matters. He was quick to recognise Lord Raglan's difficulties, and to see that the work cut out for him was not rendered the less onerous by the fact of England being embarked on such a serious operation as the invasion of the Crimea after a peace of forty years' duration, with her army reduced in numbers, the administrative services calculated for peace and colonial requirements, and a total deficiency of that organisation which can alone ensure success in war. In spite of the murmurs and complaints, which Sir Colin Campbell never suffered in his hearing without rebuke, he felt confident that ultimate success would crown the endeavours of the Allied Armies. Above all, he had unbounded confidence in Lord Raglan whom he served with single-hearted devotion.'

Taking leave of the Highlanders just before his final departure for England, after the proclamation of peace, Sir Colin said:—'I am now old, and shall not be called to serve any more, and nothing will remain to me but the memory of my campaigns and of the enduring, hardy, generous soldiers with whom I have been associated, whose name and glory will long be kept alive in the hearts of our country-

¹ Shadwell's *Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde*.

men. . . . Though I shall be gone, the thought of you will go with me wherever I may be, and cheer my old age with a glorious recollection of dangers confronted and hardships endured. A pipe will never sound near me without carrying me back to those bright days when I was at your head, and wore the bonnet which you gained for me, and the honourable decorations on my heart, many of which I owe to your conduct.'

Sir Colin Campbell was created a G.C.B. in 1855; and two years later, as already stated, he was offered the post of Commander-in-Chief in India. 'Never,' he said, 'did a man proceed on a mission of duty with a lighter heart and a feeling of greater humility; nor yet with a juster sense of the compliments that had been paid to a mere soldier of fortune like myself in being named to the highest command in the gift of the Crown.' We have seen how promptly he started. At Ceylon, he heard of the deaths of Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Hugh Wheeler. Reaching Calcutta early in August, 1857, he assumed command of the army on the 17th of that month. But instead of proceeding at once up country, he conceived it to be his duty to remain for a time at the Presidency town, where he was joined by Major-General Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst) for whose services as Chief of the Staff he had made a special request. He learned from Sir Patrick Grant, who up to this time had been in temporary chief command of the army, that until a force could be collected at Allahábád of

sufficient strength, irrespective of the garrison necessary for the security of that place, the Commander-in-Chief would be more usefully employed in superintending the reception and despatch to the front of the reinforcements as they arrived from England, and in collecting stores and supplies¹, without which it would be impossible to put an army in the field, than as the chief of an isolated position the communications of which with the capital were cut off. 'However, annoying,' he wrote to a friend, 'here I must remain for the present.'

This delay at Calcutta was not altogether acceptable to the army at large. It was thought that the Commander-in-Chief would have done better to leave the arrangements at Calcutta to subordinate officials, and to push on to the front himself in order to reanimate, by his presence, the wearied and harassed troops operating in the North-West. But when Sir Colin Campbell once made up his mind to a fixed course of action he was not easily diverted from it. In other respects his stay in Calcutta was doubtless an advantage both to himself and to the Government, insomuch as it facilitated the establishment of cordial relations with the Viceroy, Lord Canning, whose ever ready co-operation and advice in the subsequent movements of the army were of no small value.

¹ During the Peninsular War, the Duke of Wellington, who was necessarily much occupied with the question of food and supply, used humorously to say that he did not know that he was much of a general, but he prided himself on being a first-rate commissariat officer.

With characteristic simplicity, the gallant old Scotchman lamented, at this time, that he found officers of every rank anxious to be at least Divisional Commanders at the head of small columns, independent of control. This, no doubt, was rank heresy from the Commander-in-Chief's point of view. At the same time, it is a matter for grave doubt whether they were not more in the right to wish it than their Chief was in condemning their ambition. Sir Colin Campbell began, indeed, at this early period to display signs of an excessive prudence and tenacity of authority, which became more marked as time went on. His soldiers called him 'Old Khabardar' (Old Take Care) as the truest expression they could apply to one whom they could not help respecting, even when criticising him.

Had there been real armies acting under real generals on the rebel side, or had the war been waged anywhere else than in India, few military critics would have found fault with the large forces occasionally employed for small operations, or with the delays and combinations which too often characterised the movements of the North-Western army. But the operations of the rebel Sepoys were in truth somewhat of the nature of a guerilla warfare. The mutineers, while formidable behind stone walls, were not so when scattered about the country in disorganised mobs under indifferent leaders. Being fleet of foot and short of courage, they required to be met, beaten, and pursued without hesitation, by lightly equipped

columns acting under energetic and bold leaders, without too close a regard to maps, compasses, or strategical combinations. Moreover, in a climate in which, during a prolonged campaign, more casualties arise from disease and sunstroke than from fights, stormings, or pursuits, it is especially the duty of Commanders, if need be, to risk a loss of life in order to gain momentous objects. When Dundonald asked Nelson, just before a famous naval action, what tactics he should pursue on coming up to the enemy's fleet, he is said to have received the characteristic reply, 'Tactics be hanged, go straight at 'em.' And such considerations naturally occurred to many military men in India, who without desiring to omit proper precautions or to ignore necessary rules of strategy and tactics, nevertheless longed to see active columns under energetic commanders moving about the revolted provinces, while forces of moderate dimensions laid siege to fortified positions of importance, such as Delhi, Lucknow and Jhání.

The Indian Mutiny of thirty-four years ago called for dash and daring. No real success was ever achieved at that time in the field except by rapid movement and bold attack against heavy numerical odds; and no failure was possible except from excessive caution, or from a too rigid preference on the part of those in command for cumbersome orders, cumbersome columns, and cumbersome movements. Sir Colin Campbell, as all who served under him were well aware, was not a heaven-born leader, nor was

he gifted with much military genius. But he nevertheless possessed sterling abilities, and all those good and bad qualities of temper and habit that endear a general to the rank and file of the army. His very care in controlling the direction of a large number of columns operating over an extensive area indicated by itself a deep sense of responsibility, however much it may have shown a defective appreciation of the exact nature of the forces arrayed against him.

In calling to mind his true and simple life, we cannot but admire his patience, rectitude, and resolution. As remarked by a faithful historian (Holmes) of the Mutiny: 'He had not the wonderful dash, the power to put everything to the hazard for a great end, the absolute fearlessness of responsibility, which belonged to some other well-known leaders of that time. Yet for any work requiring methodical and precise movements, extraordinary care for details and close supervision of distant operations, few were better fitted. . . . He had fought his life's battle, too, right gallantly. Harassed by poverty for many years, he had welcomed the tardy accessions to his fortune, mainly because they enabled him to provide better for a dearly loved sister. He had never married; but his relations with his sister and with his old tried friends show what a power of love he had. No Commander-in-Chief more acceptable to the mass of Anglo-Indian officers could at that moment have been selected. Many of them already knew his appearance well, his strong, spare, soldierly figure, his high rugged fore-

head, crowned by masses of crisp grey hair, his keen, shrewd, but kindly honest eyes, his firm mouth with its short trim moustache, his expression denoting a temper so excitable yet so exact; so resolute to enforce obedience yet so genial; so irascible and so forgiving.'

It will be remembered from what has already been said, that between May and August, 1857, in which latter month Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Calcutta and assumed command of the army, almost the whole Bengal Regular Native troops were in open revolt against the Government. All the military contingents in the neighbouring Native States of Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopál, and many elsewhere, had moreover joined the mutineers,—the Gwalior Contingent alone amounting to five companies of artillery, with a magazine and siege train, two cavalry and seven infantry regiments. A large mass of police, *bad-mashes*, prisoners escaped from jails, and hereditary tribes of robbers and thieves had from time to time swelled the rebel band. Some idea of the enemy's strength may be gathered from the fact that the regular and irregular troops investing Lucknow were at one period estimated at no fewer than 200,000 men. Lower Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were, as already mentioned, comparatively quiet. The Punjab remained in our hands. But the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, comprising a territory of about 100,000 square miles, with a population of 38,000,000, were for the moment in possession of the rebels; while we had lost

our hold over Bundelkhand¹ and the neighbouring districts of the Ságar and Narbadá territories. Delhi was as yet uncaptured by the British forces. The little garrison of the Lucknow Residency was hard beset, and the communications between Allahábád and Calcutta were at times interrupted or entirely cut off. Fortunately, Allahábád, with its magazine of warlike stores, situated at the confluence of the Jumna and Ganges, had been successfully held against the enemy, and could be reached from Calcutta by the river (809 miles) or by the Grand Trunk Road (503 miles). The relief of Lucknow, the re-conquest of Oudh² and Rohilkhand, and the re-establishment of order in the Gangetic Doáb, a large tract of country lying between the Ganges and the Jumna, were achievements yet to be accomplished. It will be seen, therefore, that the situation was full of difficulties.

General Sir James Outram, who on his return from the Persian expedition at the age of fifty-four, had been appointed to the combined command of the Cawnpur and Dinápur divisions, as well as to the Chiet

¹ A high plateau and hill district of about 200 miles in length and 150 in breadth, held by a great number of petty Chiefs under British supremacy; a roadless country of fastnesses and forts, filled with a turbulent population, the name Bundela having to the Lowland Hindu much the same signification as a cateran in Scotland or a moss trooper on the border.

² Some idea of the military resources of Oudh may be gathered from the return of arms collected up to August, 1859, viz. 684 cannon, 186,177 firearms, 565,321 swords, 50,311 spears, and 636,683 weapons of sorts. During the same period 1569 forts were destroyed.

Commissionership of Oudh, had left Calcutta on the 16th of August for the upper provinces, in company with Colonel Robert Napier (afterwards Field Marshal Lord Napier) of the Bengal Engineers, as Chief Divisional Staff Officer. Brigadier Havelock was fruitlessly endeavouring, as we have already seen, to push his way to Lucknow, while Brigadier Neill was holding the country in his rear. 'We received intelligence last night,' Sir Colin wrote on the 17th of August, 'of the decision arrived at by Havelock after his affair with the enemy on the 5th instant at Baserátganj. It is most distressing to think of the position in which our poor friends are placed at Lucknow, but with the very small force under Havelock's command, and in the presence of such numbers of troops as he had opposed to him, and the whole population of Oudh arrayed in arms for the defence of their villages, he must have lost his little detachment in attempting to force his way through such numbers and difficulties as he had to encounter and surmount before he could reach the walls of Lucknow.'

In the meantime the new Commander-in-Chief gave earnest attention to the measures which he proposed to adopt for stamping out the revolt. These measures comprised, briefly speaking, three separate movements, so as to combine the advance of two columns from the Madras and Bombay Presidencies respectively, in co-operation with the great central movement which he resolved to lead in person in the direction of Oudh and

Rohilkhand¹. After assuming the chief command, he spared no pains to push on reinforcements of British troops up country as they arrived day by day at Calcutta. Some days before he reached Calcutta, H. M. S. *Shannon*, having on board Lord Elgin in diplomatic charge of the Expedition to China, had sailed up the Húglí, followed by H. M. S. *Pearl*. On the 20th of August, Captain Peel, R. N., of the *Shannon*, with his 500 British sailors and ten 8-inch guns, left for Allahábád, and was followed a few days later by further reinforcements of all arms. Thus the Commander-in-Chief was doing all that lay in his power to support the troops destined for the relief of Lucknow; while Brigadier Nicholson had fortunately reinforced the tired-out little army before Delhi with a welcome contingent of about 2500 men, European and Native, from the Punjab.

The British army before Delhi now (August) exceeded 6000 men, of whom about one-half were Europeans. 'At Delhi,' Sir Colin wrote on the 12th of September, 'things are much as I expected. Whatever might have been our hopes and wishes to the contrary, it is an incontrovertible fact that hitherto the so-called besieging force had never been in sufficient strength to attack with a will, with due regard to the

¹ Shadwell states that Colonel Mansfield, when passing through London on his way to India to take up his post as Chief of the Staff, was consulted by the Government, and submitted a plan based on the same principles which underlay that put forward by Sir Colin Campbell.

safety of the camp and ordinary military considerations. I have so little reliable information on the nature of the position, the feeling in the town and the state of health of the troops, that I dare not venture an opinion as to what is, or is not, in the power of Wilson. But I hope to have a good report, and that the last success we have accounts of, since the arrival of his reinforcements under Brigadier General Nicholson, has been followed by increased confidence on our side and an early prospect of decided results. More we cannot hope for, and we must make every allowance for the difficulties of the General.' But encouraged by the arrival of the heroic Nicholson, General Wilson was now about to begin the siege in real earnest. What happened may best be re-told almost in the words of a narrative written at the time¹.

On the morning of the 25th of August, 1857, a strong body of the enemy was observed to issue from the Ajmere Gate and take the road to Rohtak. Lieutenant Hodson, formerly of the Guides (better known afterwards as Hodson, of Hodson's Horse), was despatched with 300 irregular horsemen to watch their movements. Pushing forward a little too incautiously, he was surrounded by a superior force, but was speedily rescued from this critical position by a body of the Jind Rájá's levies, with whose aid he attacked and routed the enemy. A far more serious contest came off on the same date at Na-

¹ *Allen's Indian Mail*, 1857.

jafgarh. Nearly 7000 mutineers with eighteen guns quietly proceeded from the city in order to intercept the siege train of heavy guns expected from Firozpur. No sooner was this known in camp than Nicholson was instructed to march with a moveable column of 1000 Europeans and 2000 natives to overtake the enemy. At five o'clock in the afternoon he came up with them, after a march of twenty miles, and at once advanced to the attack. A sarái (walled enclosure) with four guns in position was carried by a brilliant charge, and four more guns were captured at a bridge a little further on. After destroying the bridge, the troops bivouacked all night upon the ground, and next day returned to camp with thirteen guns. Their loss, however, had been considerable; 120 of their number being killed and wounded, most of whom fell in an attack upon a handful of Sepoys in occupation of a small village. The enemy made another attempt on the outposts on the 26th, but were repulsed by a volley of grape from the centre battery.

The engineers were now assiduously engaged in clearing the ground for the breaching batteries, and on the 4th of September, 1857, over thirty pieces of heavy ordnance, with ample supplies of ammunition, arrived in camp. From this date until that of the grand assault, reinforcements continually poured in, Europeans, Kashmírians, and Sikhs following one another in rapid succession, until at last an army of some strength was encamped before the long

beleagured city. Strange to say, the enemy made no attempt to disturb the men while constructing the first parallel, nor were they once fired upon until their labours were completed and their guns were in position. It is said, indeed, that the attention of the rebels was diverted by a heavy fire from the Ridge, and that the first intimation they received of the existence of this new battery of ten guns was in the shape of a huge missile. The battery was known as Brind's; it was only 650 yards from the walls and was mainly instrumental in silencing the formidable Kashmir and Mori bastions. The British batteries were now completed, and on the morning of the 11th a cannonade from the first battery, commencing with a salvo of nine twenty-four pounders, brought down large fragments of masonry. The second battery opened soon afterwards, knocking to pieces the curtain between the Kashmir and water bastions. Next morning the third battery came into play. And from that moment until the assault, fifty heavy guns and mortars poured an incessant storm of shot and shell upon the walls of the city. The rebels, however, stood bravely by their crumbling walls, keeping up a continuous roll of musketry until the Engineers reported two practicable breaches near the Kashmir and Water bastions, and arrangements were made for an assault at daybreak of the 14th of September.

The attack was made by four columns, with a fifth held in reserve. The first, commanded by Nicholson, consisted of H.M.'s 75th, the 1st Bengal Fusileers,

and 2nd Punjab Infantry. The second included H.M.'s 8th and 61st Regiments and the 4th Sikh Infantry. The third consisted of H.M.'s 52nd, the 2nd Bengal Fusileers, and 1st Punjab Infantry. The fourth was made up of detachments of European regiments, the Sirmur battalion of Gúrkhas, the Guides Infantry, and the Kashmírian levies. The Reserve was composed of the 60th Rifles, the Kumáun battalion of Gúrkhas, and the 4th Punjab Infantry.

The fourth column was the first to advance. It was directed against the Kishenganj and Tahari-pur suburbs, and was intended as a diversion in favour of the real attacks. This, at least, was all it succeeded in doing; for, notwithstanding the gallantry displayed by the commander, his troops failed to dislodge the enemy. The other three columns were more successful. Up to the moment of their advance into the open, the batteries kept up a heavy fire, and swept the walls of the city. The Rifles were the first to rush forward, skirmishing along the front. The first column was under orders to storm the breach near the Kashmír Bastion, the second that in the Water Bastion, and the third to assault by the Kashmír Gate, as soon as it should be blown open. With a fierce exultant shout, the first and second columns dashed onward, scrambled into the ditch, applied their ladders to the scarp of the wall, and swarmed up into the breach under a murderous fire of musketry.

Nicholson quickly effected a lodgment in the main-

guard, and swept the ramparts as far as the Mori Bastion. The second column also made good its hold of the Water Bastion, and proceeded to give a hand to the others ; the third column likewise entered the city through the Kashmír Gate. The blowing open of that gate was the most perilous exploit of the day. The explosion party, under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, R.E., was composed of Sergeant John Smith, Sergeant A. B. Carmichael, and Corporal F. Burgess, all of the Sappers and Miners ; Bugler Hawthorne, of the 52nd Foot, and twenty-four Native Sappers and Miners. As the foremost hastily advanced with the powder bags, the rebels partially opened the wicket, and fired at them from under secure shelter. The bags, nevertheless, were attached to the iron spikes with which the gate was studded. Sergeant Carmichael was the first slain, as he laid the train : Lieutenant Salkeld then stepped forward to fire it, but was shot in the arm and leg, and fell into the ditch. As he was falling, he threw the match to Corporal Burgess, who was mortally wounded after he had accomplished the dangerous feat. One of the natives also was killed, and two were wounded. Home then made the bugle sound the advance three times. The column obeyed the call, and, springing forward with a British cheer, rushed through the ruined gateway, over the rebels who had been killed by the explosion. The first spectacle that met their eyes was said to be the dead body of a European chained to a stake, at which he had apparently been

roasted. Three other Europeans had been here sacrificed, and an English woman, naked and covered with sores, was said to be chained to the bastion, gibbering and shrieking, a hopeless maniac¹. Nothing could now withstand the fury of the onslaught. The Church, the College, and Skinner's house were soon in possession of our troops; but as they diverged into the narrow streets, their progress was checked by double discharges of grape-shot from pieces of heavy artillery placed to bear upon every avenue. While encouraging his men to make a second rush at a gun, the heroic John Nicholson² received a wound which proved to be mortal. That night 'St. George's banner, broad and gay,' waved over the Kashmír Gate, and the headquarters of the army were established in Skinner's house.

The next day was consumed in making good this position, and in battering the outer wall of the magazine, in which a practicable breach was effected before sunset. At dawn of the following morning (September

¹ Subsequent investigation has shown these stories of murder and outrage to be exaggerated.

² Nicholson was one of those political soldiers of whom India has produced so many distinguished types. He lingered in great agony long enough to catch a glimpse of the accomplishment of that task to which he had so sternly and zealously laboured to contribute, and expired on the 13th of September, in the thirty-fifth year of his age. 'Nicholson is dead,' was the hushed whisper that struck all hearts with grief. His grave now lies, it is said, but little cared for. But 'the hoofs of his war-horse are to be heard ringing at night over the Pesháwar valley' by his superstitious frontier men, who believe that 'until that sound dies away, the rule of the Feringis in the valley will endure.'

16th) a detachment of the 61st regiment suddenly sprang forward with a ringing shout, and the terror-stricken rebel artillerymen threw down their lighted port fires and fled without discharging a single shot; six heavy guns, loaded with grape, frowned upon the breach. On the 17th the Bank and its extensive gardens, together with the Jamá Masjid, fell into the hands of the victors, and guns were placed to bear upon the palace and the bridge of boats.

Two hundred and six pieces of ordnance, besides a vast supply of ammunition, were the prize of conquest; in addition to an immense amount of plunder. It was not, however, until the 20th of September that the city and palace were entirely evacuated by the enemy, and Delhi became the undisputed trophy of British pluck and perseverance. On the following day, General Archdale Wilson and his gallant comrades pledged the health of the Queen in the famous Diwán-i-Khás, and loud and prolonged cheering proclaimed the re-establishment at Delhi of British supremacy. The aged monarch and his sons had fled for refuge to Humáyún's tomb, where they were discovered and arrested by Hodson, at the head of a handful of troops. The king's hoary head was duly revered, but the princes were shot. Tried afterwards by a military commission, the king was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and was transported to Rangoon, where he subsequently died.

Thus Delhi fell, although not without a loss to ourselves of about 60 officers and 1085 men killed and

wounded¹. By courage and endurance the gallant little army had restored British supremacy in the very focus of the revolt, and so made the first real step, unaided by the presence or assistance of the Commander-in-Chief, towards the suppression of the Mutiny. To sum up the position of affairs briefly, it may be said that till the capture of Delhi the prestige of British supremacy was still trembling in the balance. Had the storming failed, all might have gone. It was a struggle feebly begun but nobly ended, and its record will ever find a foremost place in the history of the Mutiny.

The news of the fall of Delhi reached Calcutta on September 26th. Writing to General Wilson three days afterwards, the Commander-in-Chief said:— ‘Pray accept my congratulations on your brilliant success. The determined character of the resistance you have encountered in the town is an unmistakable answer to the unprofessional authorities who would have tried to hurry you on to a rash attack before your military judgment was satisfied of the sufficiency of your means.’

From the moment that Delhi fell, Lucknow became the centre of interest to which all eyes were turned; more especially since, about this time, affairs to the southward were complicated by the revolt, as we have seen, on the 22nd of September of the famous

¹ The loss of the Delhi Field Force in killed, wounded, and missing, from May 30 to Sept. 20, 1857, amounted to 2151 Europeans and 1686 natives.

Gwalior State Contingent, which from that date played so prominent a part at Cawnpur and in Central India. There were now about 14,000 troops in Bengal, the North-West Provinces and Oudh at Sir Colin Campbell's disposal, while the bulk of the reinforcements from England were still pouring in. General Outram reached Cawnpur on the 16th of September, 1857, with sufficient reinforcements to raise the force available for the relief of Lucknow to about 3179 men. By virtue of his rank and appointment, Outram unwillingly superseded Brigadier Havelock. 'But to you,' he wrote to that distinguished officer, 'shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already struggled so much. I shall accompany you only in my civil capacity as Commissioner, placing my military service at your disposal should you please, and serving under you as a volunteer.' And here we find the key to the whole career of the 'Bayard of India.' 'Outram,' said the Commander-in-Chief, 'has behaved very handsomely.' He was indeed one of India's most famous political soldiers. Calm in action, chivalrous in conduct, simple in character, he had passed successfully through the ordeal of a long and varied career, and now ended that career, so far as active duty in the field was concerned, by a noble act of self-abnegation, followed by service as arduous as ever fell to the lot of a military officer.

On the 19th and 20th of September, 1857, Havelock's little army of 3000 men again crossed the

Ganges for Lucknow, with better chances of success than before; and, pushing on in the teeth of vigorous opposition, occupied the Alambágh, four miles from the city, three days later. Here was received, with great rejoicing by the force, the news of the fall of Delhi; while 'the guns of the defenders of the Residency, answering those of the besiegers, made it known that all was still well with them.' Leaving the sick and wounded in the Alambágh under a strong guard, the force moved on Lucknow on the morning of the 25th of September in two brigades, the first under Outram and the second under Havelock. It was decided to cross the Chárbágh bridge, then to go eastward along a lane skirting the canal, and, finally, northwards to the east side of the Residency. The bridge was found to be strongly defended by guns, while a sharp musketry fire was poured from the adjoining houses. But the position was gallantly taken by the Madras Fusileers, serving in the brigade under Neill, and Lucknow was entered¹.

At length, amid an incessant storm of shot, in which the gallant Neill fell mortally wounded, the troops reached the Residency and entered the entrenchment, after a series of operations which were as difficult as they were creditable to all concerned.

¹ For a detailed and graphic description, see Malleon, vol. i. pp. 536 *et seq.* In all these and other operations, 'Billy' (now Sir William) Olpherts, took a distinguished part. 'Believe me, my dear heroic Olpherts,' wrote Outram to him on the 28th of March, 1858, 'bravery is a poor and insufficient term to apply to a valour such as yours.'

On the morning of September 27th, when the rear-guard was brought into the Residency, there was a serious and deplorable misadventure. Certain 'doolis' carrying wounded men were taken by mistake into a courtyard occupied by the enemy, afterwards known as 'Dooli Square,' and some forty wounded men were ruthlessly murdered by the rebels. The total loss sustained by the relieving force on the march to Lucknow, and in fighting its way into the Residency, amounted to not less than 31 officers and 540 men killed, wounded, and missing.

Once fairly in the Residency enclosure, the long pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense endured by the garrison are said by an eye-witness to have burst forth in a succession of deafening cheers. It was a moment never to be forgotten. The delight of the gallant Highlanders (the 78th) who had fought twelve actions to enjoy that supreme moment of ecstasy, and who in the last few days had lost a third of their numbers, knew no bounds. As Outram and Havelock entered Fayrer's house, the 'rough-bearded warriors shook the ladies by the hand and took the children up in their arms; anxious questions were asked, actions were fought over again, news were retailed from one to another, and satisfaction and joy filled all hearts.'

With the arrival of Havelock's relieving force, the siege of the Lucknow Residency, properly so called, terminated. The two generals had entered the entrenchment with the determination of withdrawing

the garrison to a place of safety. But the difficulties in the way were so insuperable that they resolved, after much anxious deliberation, to remain there until the Commander-in-Chief could come to the rescue. The relieving force had now indeed to share with the original garrison the perils and hardships of an investment. It was virtually a blockade. But the position, extended by the seizure of certain palaces on the banks of the river, was successfully held in communication with the small force at the Alambágh during the many anxious days which intervened between the 25th of September and the long delayed relief by the Commander-in-Chief on the 27th of November following. The original garrison of the Residency was 1692 strong, of whom 937 were Europeans and 765 natives. It lost in killed 350 Europeans and 133 natives, while of the latter 230 deserted, making a total loss of 713. There remained of the original garrison, when relieved by Havelock, a total number of 979, of whom 577 were Europeans and 402 natives.

The following quotation from a despatch by Sir James Outram gives some idea of the nature and extent of the operations carried on during the second siege of Lucknow:—‘I am aware of no parallel to our series of mines in modern war; twenty-one shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3291 feet of gallery, have been executed. The enemy advanced twenty mines against the palaces and outposts; of these they exploded three which caused us loss of life, and three

which did no injury ; seven had been blown in ; and out of seven others the enemy had been driven and the galleries taken possession of by our miners—results of which the engineer department may well be proud.’

CHAPTER V

THE NORTHERN OPERATIONS (*continued*)

TO THE REDUCTION OF OUDH

ON the 28th of September, 1857, three days after Havelock had entered Lucknow, Sir Colin Campbell informed General Outram of his intention to 'proceed shortly to Cawnpur, in order to be at the centre of operations.' 'No advance will take place without me,' he added with characteristic tenacity and caution, 'even if it be made with a single regiment. . . . It is absolutely necessary for me to get into the right place for directing the movements of the army and restore something like *ensemble* to them.' Nevertheless the Commander-in-Chief still tarried at Calcutta for the arrival of further reinforcements, while Havelock and Outram were blockaded in Lucknow. On the 26th of October, Colonel Greathed's flying column from Delhi, in all 1800 Infantry, 600 Cavalry and 16 guns, after a series of successful engagements with detached bodies of the rebels, reached Cawnpur, and its arrival was most opportune. Both Cavalry and Field Artillery were sorely needed, and Colonel Greathed's force gave the Commander-in-Chief the elements requisite for the organisation of an army in the field

strong enough, in his opinion, to justify the commencement of operations under his personal supervision. He therefore started from Calcutta for the front on the 27th of October, 1857, his stay at the Presidency town having lasted since the 14th of August, or upwards of two months. He reached Cawnpur on the 3rd of November. Reinforcements soon swelled the number of his force to 5000 men with 39 guns and howitzers, besides mortars and rocket tubes. Writing to the Duke of Cambridge, just before he left Calcutta, he had said:—‘I have made up my mind not to hazard an attack which would compromise my small force. A road must be opened by heavy guns, and the desperate street fighting so gallantly conducted by Sir James Outram and General Havelock—the only course open to them—must if possible be avoided in future. Short as the time is, there must be no undue haste on my part.’

On the 9th of November, 1857, the Commander-in-Chief moved forward into Oudh with a month’s supply for all hands. On the next day he was joined by Mr. Kavanagh of the Uncovenanted Civil Service, who, disguised as a native, made his way out of the Residency to the British camp to act as guide¹. Sir Colin Campbell’s communications were now not a little threatened by the Gwalior Contingent and other rebel forces at or near Kálpi; but he left General Wyndham in command at Cawnpur, with

¹ The Victoria Cross was conferred on Mr. Kavanagh for his gallantry.

orders to strengthen the defences and to show the best front he could to the rebels, but not to move out to attack unless compelled to do so by a threat of bombardment. The Cawnpur garrison consisted of 500 British soldiers and 550 Madras Infantry and Gunners; and further detachments were expected and arrived within the week.

On November 16th, after some preliminary skirmishing in the outskirts of Lucknow, the Commander-in-Chief, who had divided his force into three Brigades under Adrian Hope, Greathed, and Russell, began his advance on the city by the line of the right bank of the Gúmí where the ground favoured an approach to the Secundra Bágh, a large brick building some 450 feet square with strong loop-holed walls. When the attack on this building had gone on for about an hour and a half, it was determined to take it by storm. Gallantly rushing onwards, the 93rd, 53rd, and 4th Punjab Rifles forced their entrance through the breaches, gateway and windows; and no less than 2000 of the enemy, who fought with the courage of despair, were slain in the building. This done, the next point of attack was the Sháh Najaf, a domed mosque with a garden around it, enclosed by a high loop-holed wall. The position was defended by the rebels with great resolution against a heavy cannonade which lasted three hours.

Of Sir Colin's Staff the two brothers Alison¹ were

¹ One is now General Sir Archibald Alison, whose distinguished career is well known.

wounded; and many of the mounted officers had their horses shot under them. Indeed at one time the enemy clearly had the advantage. But Captain Peel¹, commanding the Naval Brigade, brought up his heavy guns 'as if he had been laying the *Shannon* alongside an enemy's frigate;' while Adrian Hope with a party of fifty men crept through the surrounding jungle and brushwood, and entering the enclosure one by one through a fissure in the wall, found the rebels in full retreat. The enemy had lost heart, and abruptly abandoned a position in which the wearied troops were only too glad to rest during the night.

There was now no doubt but that Sir Colin Campbell's operations had so far been crowned with success. On the morning of November 17th the struggle re-opened with a heavy cannonade on the Mess House, which, after some six hours firing, was carried with a rush by a company of the 90th, led by Captain Wolseley², and a detachment of the 53rd. Only one building (the Moti Mahal) now intervened before Outram's position was reached. The enemy offered but slight resistance so that Hope Grant was able to meet Outram, Havelock, his son (now Sir Henry Havelock), Colonel Robert Napier, Major Eyre

¹ This gallant officer was afterwards wounded at the final capture of Lucknow, in March, 1858, and died at Cawnpur on the 27th of April of small pox.

² Now General Viscount Wolseley. He was well known in the Mutiny for dash and activity. He had a brother in the 20th Regiment, who served in the Crimea and elsewhere, and was never content unless he found himself in the thick of the fight.

and others. In a few moments more, under a sharp fire, Havelock and Outram joined Sir Colin Campbell and were able to congratulate him upon the successful accomplishment of the second relief of Lucknow.

Great was the feeling of satisfaction among the garrison, only to be followed by something like consternation when it was announced that within twenty-four hours, and against the advice of Havelock and Outram, the Residency position was to be altogether abandoned. The Commander-in-Chief had decided on this step because in his opinion the position was a false one, and could not be reached afterwards by a relieving army without incurring severe loss. There was much to be said for and against this view. On the one hand it was argued that the enemy, if attacked, would be quite ready to abandon the key of their position, the Kaisar Bâgh; and that when they had done so, the capture of the rest of the city would not be difficult, while our prestige would undoubtedly be injured by withdrawal. On the other hand it was said that the force then at Lucknow could hardly have maintained its position without neglecting military operations of greater importance elsewhere, besides which, the mutineers of the city could be held in check by a force stationed at the Alambâgh. General Outram was of opinion that an attack should be made on the Kaisar Bâgh, after which two Brigades, he thought, of 600 men would suffice to hold the city. Sir Colin Campbell was convinced that four Brigades would be necessary for this duty. He

held moreover that to lock up another garrison in the city would be only repeating a military error. The only proper way of holding Lucknow, in the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, was to have a strong moveable column, in a good military position outside the city. Writing on December 12th, Lord Canning agreed with the Commander-in-Chief. By this time, however, the withdrawal from Lucknow had been effected.

On the whole it must be admitted that the Commander-in-Chief had some grounds for preferring a retrograde movement, although in India retreat is generally followed by disaster, and in this particular instance it appeared to many to prolong unnecessarily the difficult operations of the Mutiny. Be this as it may, General Wyndham's unfortunate and unexpected failure at Cawnpur strengthened the arguments in favour of the withdrawal; while viewed merely as a military operation, whether rightly or wrongly conceived, that withdrawal did credit to all concerned. For every member of the garrison, European and native, including the women and children, was brought away from the Residency without the loss of a single life, and 'little was left to the enemy but the bare walls of the Residency buildings.' In the words of the Commander-in-Chief, who had charged Outram with the execution of this measure, 'the movement of the retreat was admirably executed and was a perfect lesson in such combinations.' The whole force was withdrawn at night, and reached the Dilkúsha at daylight on the morning of November 23rd, 1857.

Here a great sorrow overshadowed the success of the operation. At 9.30 A.M. on November 24, Sir Henry Havelock, who had been gradually sinking since his arrival at the Dilkúsha, expired, at the age of 62. He had lived just long enough to see the accomplishment of that for which he had so nobly fought, and to hear that his services had been appreciated by his Queen and country. He had the satisfaction, moreover, of being tended during his last moments by a beloved son¹. But far higher consolations than these the warrior had, for he had lived a Christian and he died a hero. His remains were conveyed to the Alambágh and there interred with marked demonstrations of respect and sorrow on the part of the troops.

On November 27th, 1857, leaving Outram in occupation of the Alambágh until he himself should be able to return and finally expel the rebels from Lucknow, Sir Colin Campbell started with the relieved garrison and a force of some 3000 men for Cawnpur. Here he found that the rebels, led by Tántia Topi, had advanced from Kálpi, forty-six miles distant, and had not only occupied all the salient positions between that place and the Ganges, but had closed in upon General Wyndham and had compelled him to fall back to a weak position near the town with the loss of both camp and baggage. Nothing could be done till the

¹ The present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, V.C. He was at that time suffering from a severe wound. A gallant soldier and a good son; his is a record of service of which any one might be proud even in a period of 'heroic deeds.'

Commander-in-Chief had provided for the safety of the women and wounded whom he had brought from Lucknow ; but quickly getting the convoy across the Ganges, *en route* for Allahábád, he attacked the rebel forces, and without difficulty drove them back again to Kálpi.

It would be tedious as well as inconsistent with the scope of this volume to relate in detail the further events of that period. It may be said, however, that after successful operations directed against Fatehgarh, a question arose as to whether the subjection of Oudh or an immediate advance into Rohilkhand should be the next move. Lord Canning advocated the former course, and Sir Colin Campbell the latter. The views of the Governor-General prevailed, and were loyally carried out by the Commander-in-Chief. But the progress made was slow and became very trying to the army. From one cause or another valuable time was lost, and the few precious months of the cold weather were allowed to slip away almost unawares. There was still a tendency, from causes which no one could fathom, but from which all caught a certain contagion, to assemble large bodies of troops, and to move about unwieldy brigades, charged with orders to risk nothing and to act 'according to the rules of war.'

The mutineers took advantage of these tactics to spread themselves over the country and defy the 'bull-dogs who were unable to catch jackals,' while all this time the rebels left unmolested in Lucknow had ample leisure to devote their energies to the task

of strengthening their position. This they did by defending it with three strong ramparts, mounted with about 130 guns and mortars, besides erecting bastions, barricades and loop-holed walls to command the streets. The first line of defence consisted of a battery of heavy guns and other formidable works; the second of bastioned ramparts and parapets, while the third or inner line covered the front of the Kaisar Bâgh. Fortunately the rebel garrison neglected to provide for the defence of the northern side of the position, and of this neglect Sir Colin Campbell took full advantage when he finally captured the city.

In a letter to Sir Hugh Rose, dated Cawnpur, Feb. 28th, 1858, after congratulating him on the success that had attended his operations in Central India, the Commander-in-Chief said:—‘I have been detained here, by desire of the Governor-General, very much longer than was convenient with reference to the service we are about to commence, to enable Jang Bahâdur to join and take part in the siege of Lucknow. . . My siege train will be collected by to-morrow at Bantira, about six miles from Alambâgh, my own troops will be assembled in that neighbourhood on the 1st proximo, and if Brigadier Franks should make his appearance about the 4th, I hope to begin to break ground the same night or following day. The place has been greatly strengthened since I was there in November, but I hope to reduce it speedily; for the weather is getting hot, and the heat will destroy and

render ineffective more men than even the fire of the enemy. Until the place falls I cannot give you any assistance in troops. I am told the 71st Highlanders are on their way from Bombay by bullock train to Mhow. If they should be required to march through Central India after arrival at Mhow they will lose many men. The mutineers at Kálpi are threatening to cross the Jumna into this Doáb the moment I advance towards Lucknow. I cannot afford to leave the force that would be sufficient for the protection of the Doáb, and it must therefore take its chance, as well as Cawnpur, which may be again occupied by the enemy, until I have disposed of Lucknow.'

Lucknow was at length captured in March, 1858. Early in the month the Commander-in-Chief with a force amounting in the aggregate to some 31,000 men and 180 guns moved on the Dilkúsha, which he occupied with but slight opposition. The task of operating separately from the left or northern bank of the Gúmti had been confided to Outram, who crossed the river and took up a position three miles to the north of the city. Under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Outram was to take the rebel position in reverse, enfilading it with a heavy fire from the left bank of the river, while Sir Colin Campbell was to move directly on the city. On March 11th our Nepálese ally, Jang Bahádur, after long delays, joined the British force with about 9000 men and 24 guns. On the same day the Begam's Palace was captured with but slight loss to the besieging force,

although all mourned the fiery Hodson¹, who here fell mortally wounded, shot by an unseen foe, whilst he and others were searching in the Palace for lurking rebels. On this day also the Secundra Bágh, the Sháh Najaf, and other strongholds of the enemy, fell into our hands. At length on March 14th, 1858, when the Engineers under the gallant Napier had completed their dangerous work of sapping through the houses in the line of the enemy's fire, General Franks was ordered to attack the Kaisar Bágh and Imámbára. These buildings were rightly considered to be the keystones of the enemy's position, and they were stormed with such vigour and success that before night Lucknow had virtually fallen into our hands.

In this operation the 20th Regiment, now the Lancashire Fusileers (supported by some companies of the 38th Regiment), bore an honourable part. In a desperate hand to hand struggle a strong position called the Engine-house was taken by these gallant men under Major (now Sir Pollexfen) Radcliffe, with a loss to the enemy of some 350 men. The fact deserves special mention, since for some unaccountable reason this and other services were left unnoticed in public despatches, and some surprise was felt in the army at the omission². The 20th Regiment had the

¹ 'The whole army,' Sir Colin wrote to Hodson's widow, 'which admired his talents, his bravery, and his military skill, deplored his loss, and sympathised with her in her irreparable bereavement.'

² It was characteristic of Sir Colin Campbell that here and elsewhere, while drawing special attention to the service of High-

satisfaction of remembering that it had previously marched up country as a part of General Franks's force, which in thirteen days had covered a long distance, beaten a superior enemy in four actions, and taken 34 guns. It performed admirable service after the siege in various parts of Oudh in frequent operations against the rebels up to November, 1859.

By March 21st, 1858, the city of Lucknow itself, after a series of desultory fights, was completely in our hands. 'It was late in the evening,' wrote Dr. Russell, the *Times* correspondent, 'when we returned to camp through roads thronged with at least 20,000 camp followers all staggering under loads of plunder—the most extraordinary and indescribable spectacle I ever beheld. Coolies, Syces, Kitmutgars, Dooli bearers, Grass-cutters, a flood of men covered with clothing not their own, carrying on head and shoulders looking-glasses, mirrors, pictures, brass pots, swords, firelocks, rich shawls, scarves, embroidered dresses, all the *loot* of ransacked palaces. The noise, the dust, the shouting, the excitement, were almost beyond endurance. Lucknow was borne away piecemeal to camp, and the wild Gúrkhas and Sikhs, with open mouths and glaring eyes, burning with haste to get rich, were contending fiercely against the current as they sought to get to the sources of such unexpected wealth.'

land regiments, he left others, which did equally good work, unnoticed. Few, however, grudged the honour done to the Highlanders, for they always behaved splendidly.

Amidst all this excitement and jubilation much regret was felt at the escape of the greater part of the rebels across the river Gúm-ti. That Outram desired to cross over the river from the northern to the southern bank by the famous Iron Bridge on March 14th, to complete the effect of the capture of the Kaisar Bâgh by a crushing rear attack on the rebels in the city, is a matter of history. But this move was not permitted, for General Outram was forbidden to act if he thought that by so doing he would 'lose a single man;' and thus a great chance was thrown away. This lost opportunity, followed by failure a few days later on the part of the cavalry in the pursuit of further bands of the flying enemy, prevented the fall of Lucknow from proving the final and crushing blow to the rebels that it ought to have been.

Instead of securing the virtual pacification of Oudh at one stroke, 'it left the province swarming with armed rebels still capable of resistance;' although after the preparations, delays, and large number of troops employed, every one expected, with some show of reason, the annihilation of the enemy as an armed and organised body. As it turned out, the rebels who escaped on the 14th and again on the 21st of March were the very men who fell back on the forts and strongholds of Oudh and Rohilkhand, there to renew the resistance which had so hopelessly broken down in the capital. The 'saving of life,' however well intended on Sir Colin Campbell's part, did not always fulfil his anticipations, and proved the cause, both now

and at other times, of unnecessary and prolonged operations, and too often of losses to worn-out troops from exposure and disease.

Such was the termination of the series of operations before Lucknow, which lasted about twenty days, with a loss of 19 officers and 608 men killed, wounded, and missing. By the end of March the British army was broken up, and a complete redistribution was effected. It had been intended by the Viceroy that the reconquest of Rohilkhand should follow the re-taking of Lucknow, and the hoped-for capture of its rebel garrison ; but the plan of the campaign was now necessarily changed. Immediate action of some kind was requisite on account of the escape of the rebels. The Commander-in-Chief was anxious to restrict operations for the moment to the clearing of the country around Lucknow. He desired to postpone an advance into Rohilkhand till the autumn. But Lord Canning would not hear of this ; and indeed it seemed impossible to remain thus inactive without considerable risk.

Immediate action, both in Rohilkhand and in Oudh, was therefore resolved on ; and as the rapid movements of Sir Hugh Rose in Central India during the period culminating in the capture of Jhán sí, in April, had freed the Commander-in-Chief from any special anxiety in that direction, he was enabled to turn his individual attention to those two provinces. Though disorganised, and to some extent demoralised, the rebels were resolved not to surrender at discretion, and it became imperative that no time should be lost

in following them up. By insisting that this should be done Lord Canning once more displayed a military knowledge and instinct of which few at that time were aware. Three columns, under Brigadiers Walpole, Penny, and Jones, were ordered to penetrate Rohilkhand from different points, supported by a fourth column under Colonel Seaton, who had been protecting the country around Fatehgarh. All four columns were to converge upon Bareilly, where, it was hoped, the main body of the rebels under Khán Bahádur Khán would be met, defeated, and captured.

Leaving Oudh for the moment to take care of itself, the Commander-in-Chief quitted Lucknow, April 7th, 1858, four days after Sir Hugh Rose had stormed and taken Jhánsí. Joining Walpole's brigade, which (with the exception of an unfortunate reverse at Ruyah, when Adrian Hope was killed) had done well, the Commander-in-Chief pushed on with a force amounting to about 7500 men and 19 guns to Bareilly. On May the 4th he was close to the place. Khán Bahádur Khán, alive to his danger, determined to show a bold front. Between the town and the Commander-in-Chief's force ran a stream, which the rebel leader crossed with the first line of his troops, leaving the second line to defend the cantonments and the town. Early the next morning Sir Colin Campbell moved forward, and after an action which lasted six hours, under a hot sun, practically gained possession of this position. With his usual solicitude

for his wearied troops he allowed them to halt in the hope of completing his victory on the next day. But during the night Khán Bahádur Khán evacuated the town with the greater part of his army.

Thus that portion of the rebel garrison which had escaped from Lucknow into Rohilkhand got back again into Oudh ; and in this way the termination of the Rohilkhand campaign was not more satisfactory than the result of the operations in Oudh. Once more this latter province claimed the attention of the military authorities, and for many months to come it was the scene of extended movements under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief himself. Reaching Fatehgarh on May 25th, 1858, Sir Colin Campbell remained there till June 5th, while Brigadier Lugard and others had meanwhile been engaged under his orders in clearing Behar of rebel bands ; the operations resulting in the death of Koer Singh, one of the ablest of their leaders, and the gradual pacification of the province. A notable incident in these operations was the relief of Azamgarh, on the 6th April, 1858, by Colonel (now General) Lord Mark Kerr, who, with the headquarters of the 13th Light Infantry, a troop of cavalry, and two guns, forced his way through, and defeated, an ambuscade of many thousand Sepoys under Koer Singh.

Sir Colin Campbell now considered that the British troops in Oudh should remain on the defensive until the return of the cold weather ; but being continually harassed by small bands of rebels they were kept in

incessant movement. What was done in Rohilkhand with two brigades required, in the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, six brigades in Oudh, independent of the garrison of Lucknow. A large force, moreover, of military police was raised to assist the troops, while arrangements were made to move the various detachments on a general plan and with one common object. This object was an advance into Oudh from two points simultaneously; that is to say, from the frontier of Rohilkhand in order to drive the rebels in a north-east direction towards the Rápti river, and at the same time from the south-east against the districts situated south of Lucknow between the Ganges and the Gogra.

By the end of October, 1858, the two columns had reached their respective positions, and were enabled to establish the civil power as they advanced, while pushing the rebels northwards into Nepál. Thus the Commander-in-Chief moved northwards from Lucknow with a force acting in concert with the troops under Hope Grant. The Náná and his brother Bala Ráo, flying from the pursuit, escaped eventually into Nepál with many thousand Sepoys. Sir Hope Grant was then left in Oudh with instructions to watch matters on this frontier, while Sir Colin Campbell, glad of rest, rejoined the Governor-General at Simla.

The series of petty although harassing operations which were carried on in Oudh and Rohilkhand at this period, although very creditably performed by our troops, need only be lightly touched upon. To trace

in detail the work of the detached columns¹ would be tiresome and superfluous. Nevertheless the duty was most arduous and trying. The courage of the officers and the endurance of the men were more severely tested in these minor operations than in the greater achievements of the campaign. The march of each column and the commencement of each attack was guided from headquarters, and watched with vigilance and solicitude. As the different commanders depended one upon another their movements were ordered and arranged accordingly, so that while the number of small affairs was considerable, on no occasion was a particular Commander under the necessity of fighting against odds which he could not easily overcome. Sometimes, however, during this anxious period, in which the behaviour of the troops, both British and native, was all that could be desired, the various columns halted, occasionally for weeks, while the enemy escaped or reformed in new positions. Nor was it until November, 1859, that the last body of rebels in Northern Oudh, to the number of about 4000 men, surrendered to a force mainly composed of the 20th Regiment under Brigadier (now Sir Edward) Holdich. One of the more prominent leaders here taken was Jawálá Parshád (the Náná's principal adviser at the Cawnpur massacre), who, before being

¹ Brigadier Eveleigh's column was specially noted at the time for its rapid and successful movements, and for the able manner in which the Brigadier directed its operations and taught selected men of the column to act as mounted infantry and to become practised artillery men.

executed, named to the writer of this volume the place where the Náná was hiding in Nepál.

With this brief sketch of the operations in Northern India we leave Sir Colin Campbell and his gallant troops in order to review those movements which had been carried out, during some part of the same period, southwards in Central India. It only remains to say that Sir Colin Campbell, after staying in India long enough to see the embers of the great Sepoy revolt smoulder away, left Calcutta on June 4th, 1860. He had been raised to the peerage for his services in India, and as Field-Marshal Lord Clyde died at Chatham on August 14th, 1863, generally beloved and regretted. On the stone that marks the spot where he lies in Westminster Abbey he is worthily named as one 'who by his own deserts through fifty years of arduous service, from the earliest battles of the Peninsular War to the pacification of India in 1858, rose to the rank of Field-Marshal and the peerage. He died lamented by the Queen, the Army, and the people, on the 14th of August, 1863, in the 71st year of his age.'

CHAPTER VI

THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS TO THE FALL OF JHÁNSÍ

‘IN five months, the Central India Field Force traversed 1085 miles, crossed numerous large rivers, took upwards of 150 pieces of artillery, one entrenched camp, two fortified cities and two fortresses all strongly defended, fought sixteen actions, captured twenty forts; and never sustained a check against the most warlike and determined enemy, led by most capable commanders then to be found in any part of India¹.’

Were it possible to follow the example of Gibbon, who summarised in half a dozen lines a campaign that extended from Gaul to Constantinople, the above sentence would be a sufficient record of the operations in Central or Southern India under Sir Hugh Rose. But a somewhat fuller account, taken in great part from Sir Hugh Rose’s own correspondence, will be more in consonance with the object of the present volume, and may not be without interest for the general reader, even though the story has already

¹ Earl of Derby’s speech, House of Lords, April 19th, 1859.



LORD STRATHNAIRN

been graphically told by Colonel Malleon and other writers.

Hugh Henry Rose was born at Berlin on the 6th of April, 1801. He was a son of Sir George Rose, G.C.B., then Minister Plenipotentiary at the Prussian Court; and it was at Berlin that he acquired the rudiments of a military education. Entering the British Army in 1820, he quickly rose in his profession; obtaining his majority within a few years, in recognition of the tact and intelligence with which he performed responsible duties in Ireland during the Ribbon and Tithe disturbances. At a later period, when at Malta, in command of the 92nd Highlanders, he gained high praise from his superior officers, not only for his military qualifications, but also for courage and humanity during an outbreak of cholera among the troops. He had visited every man of his regiment who fell ill, and encouraged all around him by his activity and cheerfulness.

In 1841, when serving on special duty with Omar Pasha's Brigade in Syria, during the operations against Mehemet Ali and the Egyptian Army, he greatly distinguished himself in the field. On one occasion, during a reconnoissance in the neighbourhood of Ascalon, he put himself at the head of a regiment of Arab cavalry, successfully routed the Egyptian advanced guard, and thus saved Omar Pasha from a surprise which might have entailed heavy loss. For this and other services, besides receiving a sword of honour and the *Nishan Iftihar*

from the Sultan, he was made a Companion of the Bath. He was also allowed to accept the Cross of St. John of Jerusalem, which Frederick William of Prussia presented to his 'former young friend' for his gallant conduct.

Soon after these events, Colonel Rose was appointed British Consul-General in Syria. The position of affairs in the Lebanon was exceedingly complicated. The French and Egyptians still remembered that Syria had once been theirs; the Christian Maronites and Muhammadan Druses were still divided by their hereditary feuds. Local disturbance culminated in civil war; and during these troubles Colonel Rose displayed his accustomed coolness and indifference to personal danger. On one occasion, in 1841, when he found the Maronites and Druses drawn up in two lines, and firing at each other, he rode between them, at imminent risk to his life, and by the sheer force of a stronger will stopped the conflict. At another time he proceeded by himself—after all the consular officers of the other Powers had declined to move—to a district where civil war was actually raging; and by his personal influence saved the lives of some 700 Christians, whom he conducted in safety, after a long and arduous journey, to Beyrout; lending his own horse to the way-worn women while he himself went on foot.

At a subsequent period during which cholera raged with great fury in Beyrout, when, to use the words of an address presented to him by grateful eye-witnesses,

‘the terror-stricken Christian population abandoned their houses and fled to the country’—he alone of all the Europeans, with the exception of one medical officer and some sisters of charity, remained behind to visit the huts of the diseased and dying. ‘Language faintly conveys,’ says the address, ‘the impression created by conduct so generous and humane; but the remembrance of it will never be effaced from the hearts of those who were the objects of such kindness, nor will such devotion easily be forgotten by those who witnessed it.’

In recognition of his services in Syria, Lord Palmerston appointed Colonel Rose in January, 1851, to be Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople. Two years afterwards, when acting as *Chargé d’Affaires* in Lord Stratford de Redcliffe’s absence, he completely baffled the intrigues of the Russian envoy, Prince Menschikoff.

Sir Hugh Rose’s own account of the incident was as follows. Early one morning he received an urgent message from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting his immediate attendance at the Porte on a matter of importance. On meeting the Minister and the Grand Vizier he learnt that they had just received a demand from Prince Menschikoff, requiring that the Sultan should sign a Secret Treaty, vesting in Russia the protection of all Christians in Turkey. Such a demand, the Grand Vizier said, was completely subversive of the sovereign rights of the Porte, and totally opposed to the policy to which

England and the other five Powers, including Russia herself, were pledged,—they having signed treaties guaranteeing the Sultan's independence and the integrity of his dominions. In these circumstances, the Grand Vizier wished to know what Colonel Rose was prepared to do, as agent for Her Majesty's Government, to assist the Porte. He replied that it was for the Porte to specify the assistance required, but that he would immediately send off an express message to Belgrade or Vienna, or a steamer to Malta, with the intelligence to Her Majesty's Government.

'Oh,' replied the Grand Vizier, 'special messengers and steamers are too late. We must sign the Secret Treaty by sunset this evening, or Prince Menschikoff will demand his passports. We wish to see the British Fleet in Turkish waters.'

Colonel Rose rejoined that as *Chargé d'Affaires* he had no right to demand the appearance of Admiral Dundas and his Fleet in Turkish waters; his powers only allowed him to point out to the Admiral, as quickly as possible, the gravity of the situation at Constantinople, and the serious responsibility which would devolve on him were he to decline to appear, as requested, with the Fleet. The Grand Vizier observed that the Sultan's Ministers would be quite satisfied if Colonel Rose wrote a letter to the Admiral in that sense, and to this the *Chargé d'Affaires* assented¹.

¹ The letter was dated March 8th, 1853. Admiral Dundas, on the

Not long after sunset, the Porte's chief Dragoman came to Colonel Rose at Therapia to inform him that Prince Menschikoff had presented his demand for their signature of the treaty, and that they had refused it. The despatch sent to Admiral Dundas, though not acted on, had gained its object.

On the outbreak of the war with Russia in the following year Colonel Rose was appointed Queen's Commissioner at the headquarters of the French Army, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.

During the progress of the campaign he was repeatedly thanked by the French commanders, and was recommended by Marshal Canrobert for the Victoria Cross, for conspicuous gallantry on three occasions during the siege of Sebastopol. He had

14th idem, replied to the effect that he did not feel justified in sending the Fleet up to Vourla without directions from home. Supported by the opinion of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, then on leave in England, Her Majesty's Government, believing that Colonel Rose had acted hastily, approved of Admiral Dundas's refusal. Lord Stratford himself seems to have laboured under the erroneous impression that no one knew how to act at Constantinople except himself. He had his own way; and hastily returning to that place on April 5th, he commenced a series of futile negotiations which ended in his being himself compelled to summon the Fleet, on October 20th; too late by seven months for any practical purpose, and too late, alas, to prevent the unfortunate Crimean War, which had then become inevitable. As Kinglake has justly said (*Crimea*, vol. i, p. 99), 'Colonel Rose being a firm, able man, was not afraid of responsibility, and was therefore not afraid to go beyond the range of common duty.' Although disavowed by the Government at home, his mere consent to call up the Fleet allayed the panic and intrigue which at that moment was endangering the very life of the Ottoman Empire; and it is as certain that had his wishes been attended to, there would have been no war.

distinguished himself both at the Alma and at Inkerman. In 1885 Sir Robert Morier, now Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, told the present writer that he had recently met the officer who had commanded the Russian pickets along the Inkerman heights. This officer mentioned, as one of the most remarkable incidents of the day, that he had seen through the mist a tall, gaunt figure riding leisurely down the Tchernaya road under a withering fire from the whole line of pickets. The horseman turned neither to the right nor to the left, nor could the Russians hit him. Suddenly they saw him fall headlong with his horse. After a few minutes, paying no attention to the firing, the mysterious horseman got up, shook himself, patted his horse, and led the animal leisurely back up the road. The Russians were so awe-struck, that an order was sent along the line to cease firing on the man, who we 'afterwards learnt,' said the Russian officer, 'was Colonel Rose.'

Lord Clarendon warmly commended 'the way in which Colonel Rose maintained the best relations with the French Commander-in-Chief and his Staff, and the advice he had tendered at different times in a highly becoming tone and spirit, in conformity with the wishes and opinions of Her Majesty's Government.' For his services in the Crimea he was promoted to be a Major-General, was made a Knight of the Bath, and a Commander of the Legion of Honour.

Such were the antecedents of the man whose work in India we have now to record. Ever at the post of

danger, he never spared himself or others. What he did was always done courageously and thoroughly. His whole career was an example of earnestness amid which certain weaknesses of temper and disposition may well be forgotten. If at times he seemed to show too little consideration for those immediately around him, he was nevertheless devoted to the army generally. Any scheme for the benefit of the soldiers invariably received support from his pen and purse. A strict military disciplinarian, he was just and unflinching. Never was there an army equal to the Central India Field Force, either for fighting powers or discipline, when engaged in the field; and never was the army in India in such order as when he commanded in chief¹.

In the field, the rebel Sepoys of the Mutiny could make nothing of the general who routed and destroyed them. His rapid marches and indomitable energy struck terror into their hearts. Who could withstand a leader who—ignoring all traditions of ordinary tactics, and spite of cautions and reproofs—regarded himself and his troops as bullet and heat-proof? He surprised both friend and foe by grasping instinctively, with the genius of a born soldier, the great principle of Indian warfare, ‘When your enemy is in the open, go straight at him, and keep him moving; and when behind ramparts, still go at him, and cut off chances of retreat, when possible; pursue

¹ For fuller details see an article on Lord Strathnairn by Sir Owen Burne, in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, of January, 1886.

him if escaping or escaped.' To his mind simplicity was the first condition of sound strategy, more especially in operations against the armed mobs of the Indian Mutiny. Complex combinations were rejected by him because he found, as others found, that they were unsuitable to this peculiar warfare.

His whole career exemplified the truth of Napoleon's favourite maxim—that a General is the head and soul of his army. It was Caesar, not the Roman legion, who conquered Gaul. It was Hannibal, not the Carthaginians, who carried terror to the gates of Rome. It was Alexander, not the Macedonian phalanx, who found a way to the Indus. It was Turenne, and not the French, who reached the Weser and the Inn. It was Frederick the Great, not the Prussian army, who defended Prussia during seven years against the three chief Powers of Europe. In all that Sir Hugh Rose did, in or out of the field in India, he inspired officers and men under him to be like himself. Every man of his force was a hero; and his troops in Central India fought their way to victory with a courage and devotion that threw many other operations of the Mutiny comparatively into the shade. And like Outram and Nicholson, Sir Hugh Rose showed that military talent may, after all, be sometimes preserved under the black coat of the diplomatist, and that peaceful avocations do not necessarily rust the faculties of a true soldier¹.

¹ Speaking of Sir Hugh Rose two years afterwards, in the House of Lords, the Duke of Cambridge, who accorded him a generous

But it is time to consider the part he took in the Indian Mutiny Campaign. After the Crimean War, being desirous of serving in India, Major-General Sir Hugh Rose was given by the Duke of Cambridge a division in the Bombay Presidency. Reaching Bombay on September 19th, 1857, he was shortly afterwards placed in command of a field force, with orders to march through Central India to Kálpi and 'to give a hand,' as it were, to Sir Colin Campbell's army, then operating on the lines of the Jumna and Ganges. At this time the whole of the difficult country to the north of the Narbadá was in the hands of the rebels. The Gwalior Contingent held Kálpi; the redoubtable Rání of Jhánsí was in undisputed possession of the large tract of country surrounding her fortress; while Tántia Topi and the revolted Gwalior Contingent were close at hand to assist her in opposing the advance of Sir Hugh Rose's little force. In all that part of India the mass of the population had been able for nearly twelve months to encouragement and support in his operations in the field, said: 'Certainly if any officer ever performed acts of the greatest valour, daring, and determination, those acts were performed by Sir Hugh Rose. I personally had an opportunity in the Crimea of seeing what manner of man my gallant friend was, and of what stuff he was made; and I was satisfied at the time that if ever the right occasion presented itself, he would be found to distinguish himself in the extraordinary manner which he has lately done. Permit me to say that he was at the head of a very small European force, and that a very large proportion of the troops under his command were natives, regular Sepoys; and I have reason to believe that these troops on all occasions conducted themselves with a valour and bearing equal to that displayed by the Europeans.'

do, without let or hindrance, whatsoever was right in their own eyes. After the second relief of Lucknow, in November, 1857, they were encouraged to still greater boldness by the lull in the movements of the Northern army, and by the knowledge that while military operations in that direction had been conducted in an open country, those undertaken in Central India, on the contrary, would have to be carried on in the jungles, ravines, and broken ground of the Vindhya range and Bundelkhand, where the people, secure in their mountain fastnesses and strong forts, had defied the efforts of Muhammadan Emperors to subdue them, and had not yet settled down under British rule.

Sir Hugh Rose's force was composed of two brigades ; the first under Brigadier Stuart, of the Bombay army ; the second under Brigadier Steuart, of the 14th Light Dragoons, the whole amounting to about 4500 men, of whom four regiments were native. He had many difficulties to contend with on assuming command. Supplies were, and would be, scarce ; and there was very little carriage. None of the batteries of artillery were complete, either in men or horses ; while the siege artillery was altogether inadequate for the work before it. In fact, there was much to be done to fit the force for the field ; but the General was not a man to brook delay. Everything was ready in an incredibly short space ; and those who had called him a griff soon had to confess that 'griffs' were sometimes the very best leaders.

Having taken severe measures, with the approval

of Government, to punish revolt and restore order in the State of Indore, Sir Hugh Rose, early in January, marched to the relief of Ságár. This duty had been assigned to the Madras Column under Brigadier Whitlock ; but the Madras Column was hopelessly in the rear, and could not reach its objective under two months, while on the other hand the situation at Ságár was extremely critical. The garrison of the fort was composed of one weak company of European Artillery and about forty officers of the covenanted and uncovenanted services. To this handful of men was entrusted the protection of a large arsenal and the lives of some 170 European women and children. In the cantonments were 1000 Bengal Sepoys and about 100 irregular cavalry. Though mistrusted by the authorities and not allowed to take up any duties inside the fort, the Sepoys had so far behaved well. But a large body of mutineers were moving towards the cantonment with a view of attacking it, and unless help should arrive quickly a disaster was inevitable. In response, therefore, to the urgent appeals of the civil and military authorities of the district, Sir Hugh Rose moved rapidly forward with a portion of his force and reached Ságár from Indore in 34 days, after taking the Fort of Rathgarh on the way.

The Fort of Rathgarh, 24 miles from Ságár, was garrisoned by Valaitis (Afghán mercenaries) and Patháns, as warlike as they were desperate. It was hardly less formidable than the famed strong-

hold of Múltán. The east and south faces were almost perpendicular, the rock being scarped and strengthened by a deep, rapid river, running close beneath the walls from east to west¹. Here for four days, without a relief of guards, the British troops defended their camp against a numerous enemy on their flanks and rear; while they attacked the fortress in their front. On the night before the projected assault, the rebel garrison, dispirited by the loss of Muhammad Fazl Khán and other leaders of note, evacuated the place by an ancient sally-port. They were hotly pursued, and a considerable number were taken prisoners.

About 15 miles or so from Rathgarh was Barodia, a strong village surrounded by dense jungle. Here the rebels concentrated under the Rájá of Banpur, one of the most determined leaders of the Mutiny. It was necessary to attack him at once, and this operation was successfully carried out on January 30th after a forced march. The enemy made a determined resistance and lost some 500 men. The loss on the British side included both officers and men killed and wounded. Among the officers killed was Captain Neville², R.E., who was hit by a round shot as he was speaking to the General.

¹ In 1810, the Mahárájá Sindhia, with a force at least four times as strong as that under Sir Hugh Rose, only took Rathgarh after a siege of seven months.

² This officer had been seventy times in the trenches before Sebastopol without being touched. He had passed the previous night in writing a letter to his mother expressing the certainty he

The immediate result of these successes was the relief of Ságár on February 3rd, 1858, after the place had been invested by the rebels for upwards of seven months. One of the besieged garrison, writing on that day, said—‘Ságár was relieved this morning by the force under Sir Hugh Rose. Who can imagine the gladness that then filled the hearts of the Europeans, shut up for eight weary and anxious months? For many a month and week during this period we heard of relief being near, till we grew sick with expecting and watching for its realisation. It was about eight days ago that we knew Sir Hugh Rose’s force had arrived in the district. It heralded its approach by the bombardment of Rathgarh, one of the strongest forts in Bundelkhand. This bombardment continued for four days and nights unintermittingly. During the last three days it was sharp and quick, and the guns seemed to have been replaced by those of heavier calibre. The rebels inside the fort, among whom were some of the most daring and troublesome leaders, could not have had a wink of sleep from this constant booming, which was distinctly heard at Ságár. But to *us* it brought sweet slumbers and a happy sense of approaching security. At last to our joy it was reported that the fort had been taken, and that Sir Hugh Rose was close at hand. . . . His troops marched right through the city of Ságár in a long line, and you can imagine the impression their number made felt of death in the coming action ; yet he pressed Sir Hugh Rose with much earnestness to let him act as his A.D.C. at Barodia.

on the natives of the place. Such a thing as a European regiment had never been seen in Ságár, and we certainly never expected to see Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons. These men, and the large siege-guns dragged by elephants, were a source of much curiosity and awe to the natives. You can hardly realise our feelings after eight months of anxiety and imprisonment.'

Having thus opened the roads to and from the West and North, Sir Hugh Rose set himself to clear the way towards the East. This entailed the capture of the Fort of Garhákota, about 25 miles east of Ságár, where the mutinous 51st and 52nd Bengal Regiments, with other large bodies of rebels, had established themselves, and were devastating the country around. The fort was a strong one, built by French engineers; so strong, indeed, that in 1818 a British force of 11,000 men with 28 siege-guns only gained possession of it, after a long investment, by allowing the garrison to march out with the honours of war.

Sir Hugh Rose occupied the fort on the 13th February, 1858, after a trying march through dense jungle, under a hot sun, with the enemy keeping up a running fight all the way. Within was found a large quantity of supplies and war material, pointing to the belief that the rebels had intended to make Garhákota a central rendezvous.

The General's next object, after the capture of Garhákota, was to reach Jhánsí as quickly as possible. The capture of Jhánsí was considered of so much

importance by Sir Colin Campbell that his chief of the staff had written on January 24th, 1858: 'Sir Colin will be glad to learn if Jhānsí is to be fairly tackled during your present campaign. To us it is all important. Until it takes place, Sir Colin's rear will always be inconvenienced, and he will be constantly obliged to look back over his shoulder as when he relieved Lucknow. The stiff neck this gives to the Commander-in-Chief and the increased difficulty of his operations in consequence you will understand.'

But it was no easy task. Writing to Lord Elphinstone from Sāgar on February 29th, 1858, Sir Hugh said: 'I am unfortunately detained here by want of supplies and carriage, to the great disadvantage of the public service: I have lost nine precious days, doubly precious not only on account of lost time at a season when every hot day endangers the health and lives of the European soldiers, but because every day has allowed the rebels to recover the *morale* they had lost by my operations, which I had made as rapidly and efficiently as possible, knowing that any success with Orientals produces twice as good a result if one acts promptly and follows up one success with another. Nothing requires system so much as transport. Laying in supplies, as it is called, is perfectly easy in a fertile and peaceful country, but this will not do in my case, where a country has been devastated or is in the hands of the enemy. Then appears all the risk of a civil or occasional system of supply. Why don't you put

yourself at the head of the great question of Indian military transport? You would do your country more good than all your generals put together.'

The rebels took advantage of this enforced delay to occupy certain forts and difficult passes in the mountainous ridges which separate Bundelkhand from the Sagar district. The passes were three in number—Narut, Mundinpur, and Dhámoní. Sir Hugh Rose resolved to force them without loss of time; more especially as it was necessary to unite his first and second brigades for the attack on Jhánsí. He had accordingly sent orders to his First Brigade to march by the trunk road towards Jhánsí, and by this turning movement to clear his left flank, while he himself moved direct towards the fortress. On the way he heard heavy firing to his left. This was the First Brigade taking the Fort of Chandari on March 17th. The enemy here offered a desperate resistance; but the fort was carried by storm, with a loss on our side of 2 officers and 27 men.

The Pass of Narut was by far the most difficult of the three just named; and the enemy, under the impression that Sir Hugh Rose must move through it, increased its natural difficulties by barricading the road with *abattis* and parapets of boulders. The Rájá of Banpur superintended the defence. The next most difficult pass was Dhámoní. Very little was known about Mundinpur, the third pass, which was about twenty miles from that of Narut; but a *reconnaissance forcée* induced Sir Hugh Rose to

select this as the point of attack. Although found to be the least inaccessible of the three passes, it was still difficult ; and was defended by the Sepoys of the 50th Native Infantry, as well as by a large number of picked Bundelas.

In order to deceive the enemy as to his intention, and to prevent the Rájá of Banpur coming to the assistance of the Rájá of Sháhgarh, who defended Mundinpur, Sir Hugh Rose ordered a feint to be made against Narut ; whilst he himself attacked Mundinpur. He even marched some miles towards Narut, with his whole force ; and then counter-marching, fell unexpectedly on Mundinpur. The fight was precipitated by the ardour of an artillery officer, who galloped his guns to the right front, to drive the enemy from the heights. Just as he came into action the 50th Native Infantry, showing merely their caps, opened a heavy fire on the battery.

This brought matters to a speedy conclusion ; for it was now necessary to make a rapid advance. The fire was extremely hot, 'as rapid and hot a fire as ever I saw,' wrote Sir Hugh Rose to Sir Colin Campbell. The casualties were numerous. The General himself had a spur shot off, and his best horse wounded. But the infantry of the Haidarábád Contingent dashed down the glen with a cheer, and completely routed the surprised enemy. Driven with loss from their position, the rebels endeavoured to join another large body of their comrades who occupied the hills on the left of the road. Before they

could do this, however, Sir Hugh Rose ordered the heights to be stormed, under cover of two guns of the Haidarábád Contingent; and the enemy was driven successively from all the hills commanding the pass. Thus repulsed in flank and front, the rebels retreated through the jungle to the Fort of Sarái, and were pursued for a considerable distance.

The results of this success were most satisfactory. The next day the Fort of Sarái fell into Sir Hugh Rose's hands; and the day after that, the Fort of Marowra. So complete was the discomfiture of the rebels that Sir Robert Hamilton, who had accompanied the force as Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, annexed the whole district to our Indian possessions under a royal salute, the British flag being hoisted on the Fort of Sarái for the first time.

Writing to Sir Colin Campbell on March 9th, 1858, Sir Hugh Rose said: 'The great thing with these Indians is not to stay at long distances firing; but after they have been cannonaded, to close with them. They cannot stand. By forcing the Pass of Mundinpur I have taken the whole line of the enemy's defences in rear, and an extraordinary panic has seized them. I hope I am not over-sanguine, but I think that matters as far as we have gone look well. All in our rear is really police work; and all I want is a reserve to occupy the country I take, and prevent my flanks and rear being turned as I advance. A military police, organised on the Irish Constabulary system, is what is needed here, and in India generally.'

Sir Hugh Rose now continued his march to Jhánís, which lay 125 miles north of Ságar. Great importance was attached by the British authorities to the fall of this fortress and city. It was looked on as the stronghold of the mutineers in Central India. The rebel garrison included 10,000 Valaitis (Afghán mercenaries), and Bundelas (as the people of Bundelkhand are called); besides 1500 mutinous Sepoys, of whom 400 were cavalry. The number of guns in the city and fort was estimated at from thirty to forty pieces.

Nowhere in India had the people displayed a more intense hostility to the English. In June, 1857, after the overthrow of British authority at Delhi, 67 Englishmen and women were murdered at Jhánís in the most deliberate way. The principal inhabitants and leading tradesmen, headed by *ulemas* and fanatics, marched with their victims in solemn procession to the place of execution, singing verses of the Kuran, and in particular the ruthless text, 'No mercy to Giaours.' The English prisoners, amongst them the Resident, Captain Skene, and other functionaries, with their wives and children, were marshalled in regular order; and on reaching the ruins of an old mosque were halted, carefully separated, the men from the women and children, and hacked to pieces by the butchers of the city.

But anxious as were Lord Canning and the Commander-in-Chief that Jhánís should speedily fall, they were so impressed with its strength, and with the

inadequacy of the force for its attack, that Sir Hugh Rose was given the option of masking it and continuing his march to Kálpi. But rather than leave such an important stronghold in his rear, he determined to take it at all risks. This decision is a matter of some historical interest. Much as Sir Colin Campbell might desire to be relieved of 'the stiff neck' caused by having so constantly to look over his shoulder at Jhán sí, he began to doubt Sir Hugh Rose's ability to take the place with a comparatively small force; while he foresaw that a check before so strong a fortress would be little short of disastrous. The Commander-in-Chief had accordingly authorised Sir Hugh Rose¹ to pass by Jhán sí if, after weighing all the circumstances of the case, he considered that the siege could not prudently be undertaken; and to march instead, in two divisions, one on Kálpi through Charkhári, and the other on Bándá. Lord Canning wrote on the same day to Sir Robert Hamilton, expressing a wish that, as Sir Hugh Rose was too weak in European infantry to run any risks, he 'should not consider himself under any obligation to attempt the reduction of Jhán sí against the possibility of success.'

But the General in command had no doubt on the subject, and resolved to carry out his original instructions at all risks, seeing how fatal it would be to leave a garrison of some 11,000 desperate men, under one of the most capable leaders of the Mutiny, to harass his

¹ Feb. 11th, 1858.

march onwards, and thus effectually prevent the pacification of Bundelkhand. A month later, being alarmed at the perilous position of the loyal Chiefs of Panna and Charkhári, the Government of India sent orders to General Whitlock to march to their relief, and directed Sir Hugh Rose (March 7th and 13th, 1858) to co-operate in this duty. 'It is the Governor-General's wish,' wrote the Government Secretary to Sir Robert Hamilton, 'that this object should for the present be considered paramount to the operations before Jhánsí, and that Sir Hugh Rose should take such steps as may most effectually contribute to its accomplishment.' On receiving these instructions, Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Robert Hamilton both informed the Government of India that the military commander desired to conform with them, but after and not before the siege of Jhánsí.

'To relieve Charkhári,' said Sir Robert Hamilton (March 13th, 1858), 'by this force would involve refusing Jhánsí, and the suspension of the plans of operations towards Kálpi; both of which operations form the ground-work of Sir Hugh Rose's instructions. However anxious, therefore, the desire to aid the Rájá of Charkhári, Sir Hugh Rose is compelled to consider the movement of his force, or of any part of it, in the direction of Charkhári at present impossible. The advance of this force on Jhánsí, in the opinion of Sir Hugh Rose, is calculated to draw the rebels to assist in its defence; whilst the fall of this fortress and its possession by us will break up the

confederacy, take away its rallying point, and destroy the power and influence of the Rání, whose name is prominently used to incite rebellion.'

Following up this letter, Sir Hugh Rose wrote himself to the Government of India on March 19th, 1858, expressing his wish to obey their instructions at a fitting time, as they completed a plan of operations which he and Sir Robert Hamilton had on the previous day agreed it would be advantageous to carry out 'after the reduction of Jhánís.' He also wrote on the same day to General Whitlock informing him of his intention to attack Jhánís at once and to co-operate with him afterwards. On the following day, March 20th, 1858,—Sir Hugh Rose himself being engaged from sunrise to sunset at the outposts in reconnoitring duty and in placing in position the siege batteries,—Sir Robert Hamilton again addressed the Government of India, recapitulating the reasons why the General considered it important to attack Jhánís¹. Sir Hugh

¹ It is expedient to give these facts at some length since Sir Robert Hamilton, in a memorandum written four years afterwards (March 20th, 1862) averred that Sir Hugh Rose hesitated to disobey the orders received, and that he (Sir R. Hamilton) took on himself the responsibility of 'proceeding with the operations against Jhánís.' As this assertion has obtained for him the credit of having saved the campaign, it is right to state that it has no foundation, and was evidently made from memory. It is hardly likely, to say the least of it, that the military commander would have allowed the political officer to supersede his authority in so momentous a military decision; although it must be acknowledged that Sir Robert Hamilton did good service in agreeing with that decision, inasmuch as an opposite course would manifestly have increased the difficulties of the moment. Sir Hugh Rose never thought it

Rose's decision was generously and frankly approved (March 30th, 1858) by Lord Canning.

Not having been able to obtain any plan of the city and fortress, and being provided only with an old and erroneous map of the country round, Sir Hugh Rose had to reconnoitre all the positions and defences about Jhānsí, to a considerable distance. 'We arrived before the city at 7 a.m. on the morning of March 20th,' says a writer already quoted. 'The General and his staff rode off to reconnoitre. We were short of water, firewood, and grass; there was not a tree to give shade to the troops, and we remained out in the open till the return of the General at 6 p.m.'

The fortress of Jhānsí stood on a high rock, overlooking a wide plain, and with its numerous outworks of masonry presented a very imposing appearance. The walls of granite, from 16 to 20 feet thick, were protected by extensive and elaborate works of the same solid construction, all within the walls, with front and flanking embrasures for artillery fire, and loopholes, some of five tiers, for musketry. Guns placed on the high towers of the fort commanded the country all around. One tower, called the

worth while to challenge a statement contradicted by the correspondence which passed. He merely wrote on the following year (June 26th, 1863) in a public despatch: 'I had always foreseen the difficulties of besieging Jhānsí with my inadequate force, which led the Viceroy and Lord Clyde to give me the option of not attacking it, but it was impossible to obey my orders to march to Kálpi, by Charkhāri, and leave such a stronghold as Jhānsí untaken in my rear.' And there he left the matter.

'White Turret,' had been raised in height by the rebels, and was armed with heavy ordnance for the defence.

The fort was surrounded by the city on all sides, except on the west and part of the south faces. The precipitous steepness of the rock protected the west side of the fort; while to the south, the city wall, with bastions springing from the centre, ended in a high mound or mamelon, which protected by a flanking fire the south face of the fort. This mamelon was fortified by a strong circular bastion for five guns, round part of which was a ditch, 12 feet deep and 15 feet broad, of solid masonry. Swarms of men were always at work on the mamelon. The city itself, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles in circumference, was surrounded by a fortified and massive wall, from 6 to 12 feet thick, and from 18 to 30 feet in height, with numerous flanking bastions, armed as batteries, and with loopholes in the banquette for infantry. Outside the wall to the east was a picturesque lake and the palace of the former rājás. On the south side of the wall, and outside it, were the ruined cantonments and residences of the English officials and troops, burnt by the rebels in June, 1857. There were also, on this side, temples and gardens.

The First Brigade under Brigadier Stuart having now joined Sir Hugh Rose, the force was much strengthened in all arms, although still only an incomplete division seemingly inadequate for the task before it. Here again, as on other occasions, Sir

Hugh Rose showed his capacity as a commander by disregarding fixed rules of war, when to observe them would be mere pedantry. Had his example been followed more generally in other parts of India much time and many lives might have been saved. He had recourse to a mode of attack which under ordinary circumstances would not have been justifiable. In order to enfilade the city wall, he disconnected and separated his two attacks; while to make up for deficiencies in siege artillery, he brought up nine and six-pounder guns to fire on the enemy's defences. At the same time, wishing to invest the place as completely as possible with his small force, he established seven flying camps of cavalry and horse artillery, posting native artillery and infantry at the principal camps. These flying camps sent out patrols to a considerable distance in every direction, in order to prevent the rebels either leaving or entering the beleaguered city. *Abattis* and deep trenches were dug across the roads and tracks. Each camp, on any attempt being made to force its line, had orders to call to its aid the neighbouring camps. An observatory¹ and telegraph-post, in charge of an officer and two non-commissioned officers, was established; and from here, with the aid of a telescope—the best that could be got—the besiegers could see right into the interior of the city.

¹ It was fortunate this precaution was taken. On the evening of March 31st, flags were flying from it, indicating that Tántia Topi was coming in great force from the north to relieve the city.

Day and night a heavy fire was kept up on the fort and mamelon. Day and night the rebels served their guns, and repaired their defences. Some batteries returned shot for shot. The native women were seen working on the walls, and carrying ammunition; and often the Rání of Jhánís and her ladies, in rich attire, visited the 'Black Tower' in the cool of the evening to see how the fight went. A bombardier in charge of one of the breaching guns reported to Sir Hugh Rose, on one occasion, that 'he had covered the Queen and her ladies with his gun,' and asked permission to fire on them; but he was told that that kind of warfare was not approved.

So well were the besieging batteries served, that by March 30th—the eighth day of the investment—Sir Hugh Rose's gunners had dismantled the defences of the fort and city, or disabled the enemy's guns; and the General, to save further expense of ammunition, of which he was running short, made arrangement for the storming of Jhánís on the next day. The advance, however, of the so-called army of the Peshwá—which to the number of 20,000 men crossed the Betwá under Tántia Topi with reinforcements of heavy guns, engineering obstacles, and all the material of war—caused the assault to be deferred. At sunset on March 31st the enemy lit an immense bonfire on a rising ground on the Jhánís side of the river Betwá, as a signal to the town of their arrival. It was answered by salvos from all the batteries of the fort and city, and by shouts of joy from the defenders.

There was now no doubt that Tántia Topi sought battle with the besieging force. The reason of his self-confidence presently appeared from statements made by prisoners. Tántia Topi, they said, had been informed by his spies that nearly all the English force was scattered in the siege and investment, and that he could easily destroy the few who guarded the camp.

A more anxious moment than this seldom came to an officer in command. Sir Hugh Rose grasped the situation as coolly as if he had to deal with a parcel of school-boys out for a holiday. His military capacity was indeed to be tested by no mean ordeal; but he was equal to the occasion. Relying on himself and on the spirit of the troops he understood so well, he resolved to fight a general action with the new enemy, while not relaxing either the siege or the investment.

During the course of the evening, he moved all the available men who could be spared, and drew them up in two lines. Friend and foe bivouacked under arms opposite to each other. At midnight a report was brought in that several thousand of the enemy were crossing the Betwá by a ford some little way off, with the evident intention of turning the left of the little British force and of relieving Jhánsí from the north. The General was at once compelled to send his second line to oppose this flank movement, so that he himself was left with a force which, all arms included, did not amount to more than 900 men. He

intended to open battle at daybreak ; notwithstanding this disparity of numbers, to pour into the rebels the fire of all his guns ; and then to turn and double up their left flank. But before this plan could be carried out, Tántia Topi vigorously attacked him with all the *élan* of a foe certain of victory.

A decisive movement was therefore necessary, and this was boldly and successfully carried out by the infantry advancing against the enemy's centre, while his flanks were attacked with horse artillery and cavalry. To use Sir Hugh Rose's own words, 'the enemy poured a heavy fusillade into the cavalry ; the Valaitis jumped up in hundreds on high rocks and boulders to load and fire, but before they could reload their matchlocks, Captain Need, leading his troop in advance, penetrated into the midst of them, and for a time was so hotly engaged that his uniform was cut to pieces, although, singular to say, he only received a slight wound himself. The attack on the enemy's right by the fire of Captain Lightfoot's battery and the charge of the 14th Light Dragoons were equally successful ; and the enemy broke and retired in confusion.'

A general advance, straight against the enemy's centre, turned the retreat of the rebels into a complete rout. The whole of the artillery and cavalry were now sent forward in pursuit. The fugitives—singly or standing back to back—availed themselves of any shelter they could find. Maddened with *bhang*, they fought desperately ; springing on the pursuers, match-

lock and *tulwar* in hand, or lying down and cutting at them. The jungle, too, was set on fire by the fugitives; but nothing could check the ardour of the pursuit, for the British saw within their reach Tántia Topi's heavy artillery.

The four guns of the Eagle Troop and the Field Battery under Captain Lightfoot galloped with Sir Hugh Rose through the blazing jungle until they reached the banks of the Betwá, after capturing a horse battery. The gunners then opened fire on the enemy, who were recrossing the Betwá in wild confusion; supported by their second line, which had not yet come into action, and which now opposed the pursuing troops with artillery and musketry fire. But resistance was useless, and the pursuit was continued till dark for some 16 miles. Tántia Topi's loss in this extraordinary action was 1500 men, besides stores, siege guns, camp equipage, and materials of war; welcome booty to the victors. Tántia Topi himself fled to Kálpi, and the whole of the Peshwá's army—which by threatening Bundelkhand and taking Charkhári had so alarmed the Governor-General and his advisers as to induce them to think that its defeat should be paramount to the siege of Jhánsí—was dispersed and broken. Whitlock was able to march on Bánda. Charkhári was already an affair of the past. And all this was effected by a handful of disciplined men led by a determined and skilful General.

Nor while thus subduing a district with one hand,

would Sir Hugh Rose allow the siege operations to be for an instant relaxed with the other. Anxious to profit by the discouragement caused among the besieged and the fresh energy infused into the besiegers, the General resolved to strike at once. He gave his men no rest and they themselves did not expect it. Breach or no breach he determined that Jhânsî should be taken on the 3rd of April. And it was taken. For the men under his command, although well-nigh tired out, were no less confident and resolute.

The front and enfilading fire on the breach was so heavy that except from the fort the enemy made but little resistance at this point; but at the rocket battery on the left, which was taken by escalade, and also along the defence works on the left, likewise taken by escalade, they made a desperate resistance; first with artillery fire, rockets, stink-pots, &c., and then in a hand-to-hand fight with spears and swords.

Though the 3rd Europeans under Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell did their duty bravely, the attack by escalade on the right failed ¹, on account of the short-

¹ Here there were several casualties. Amongst the killed were two gallant young officers, Lieutenants Meicklejohn and Dick, both of the Bombay Engineers. Lieutenant Meicklejohn, leading the storming party up the ladders, had reached the topmost rung, when he was wounded, dragged from the ladder by the Valaitis, and hacked to pieces on the wall, where his body was found by Colonel Louth's column. He had spent the previous night in making his will and writing to his mother, wife of the Presbyterian clergyman at Hopetoun. In his letter he said that he felt certain he would be killed in the next day's storm, and that Sir Hugh Rose would do his best to obtain his vacancy for a younger brother.

ness of one of the ladders, the breaking down of others, and the fierceness of the defence. But the attack on the breach and the escalade on the left proved successful. To quote from Sir Hugh Rose's own notes: 'The left attack, ably and gallantly conducted by Brigadier Stuart, succeeded perfectly; its right column passing without loss or difficulty through the breach. The escalade on the left of the breach was, at the same time, gallantly led by Lieutenant (now Major-General) Webber, R.E., a first-rate officer, and the capture of the Rocket Bastion was effected after an obstinate resistance. It was only finally taken after a severe struggle inside the bastion. Colonel Louth, commanding Her Majesty's 86th Regiment, acted with

On the General's application, the vacancy was filled according to the dead man's wish. Lieutenant Dick, some days before the assault, had committed an error of judgment in screening, with the best intentions, a sergeant of Sappers, who had been *looting* in spite of the General's most positive orders. Such an example was so fatal to discipline that Lieutenant Dick rendered himself liable to a Court Martial. Sir Hugh Rose sent for the young officer and told him of the penalty he had incurred, adding: 'But I have heard of your high promise and good qualities, and I cannot subject you to a punishment which would be ruinous to your career, and deprive you of the honour of the assault. I therefore pardon you and I know you will do your duty to-morrow.' On putting his foot on the step of the scaling-ladder Lieutenant Dick said to a brother-officer, 'I never can be sufficiently obliged to Sir Hugh Rose: tell him how I have done my duty.' He ran up the ladder, received several shots, and fell mortally wounded to the ground. Sir Hugh Rose had also to deplore the death of Colonel Turnbull, commanding the Artillery, who had given remarkable proof of ability and intrepidity throughout the campaign, and who now fell mortally wounded by a shot from one of the rebel lascars.

the same cool judgment which he had shown at Chandari. The regiment carried the breach with little loss, and bringing their shoulders forward, swept round in rear of the wall, which in most instances caused the precipitate retreat of its defenders.'

The General himself, entering the breach with the troops, moved on with some companies of the 86th Regiment to take the palace. Hurrying across a large open space under fire from the fort—a fire which it was impossible to return—they fought their way through the streets to the palace gates. An entrance was soon forced, and then the conflict waxed fiercer than ever. Driven from room to room, the enemy defended themselves with the fury of despair, setting light to trains of powder on the floor, and even to the ammunition in their pouches.

The right and left attacking parties were now concentrated in the palace. The next thing to be done was to clear the city of the numerous armed rebels, who remained in the houses and were firing on the troops. Part of this task was accomplished that same day, April 3rd, not without many desperate hand-to-hand combats. In particular there was a terrible fight in the palace stables, between some men of Her Majesty's 86th Regiment, and thirty or forty Valaiti troopers of the Rání's bodyguard. The 86th Regiment here captured over thirty standards and an English Union Jack, which had been given by Lord William Bentinck to a former ruler of Jhání,

with permission to have it carried before him as a reward for his fidelity.

Toward sunset, the signalling party telegraphed from the observatory that the enemy were again approaching from the east ; and the troops, well-nigh spent, one would have thought, after their thirteen hours' fighting under a fierce sun, were nevertheless ready to begin again with as much spirit as if they were fresh from the parade ground. The alarm happily proved, however, to be a false one ; troops arriving from Tehri having been mistaken for the enemy.

The next day, April 4th, the remainder of the city was captured and occupied. In the evening, the Rání, accompanied by 300 Valaitis and 25 troopers, left the fort and fled towards Kálpi. It was afterwards discovered that her horse had been brought into the fort ditch, with the connivance of a native contingent serving with Sir Hugh Rose, and that after being let down from a window in the turret she was placed in the saddle, with her stepson in her lap, and thus escaped. Next morning, April 5th, Sir Hugh Rose occupied the fortress without meeting further resistance.

Thus ended the siege of Jhánsí. The Central India Field Force had been contending against an enemy more than double their number, and posted behind formidable fortifications ; an enemy who at the assault and afterwards defended themselves most stubbornly. For seventeen days and nights the men had never

taken off their clothes, nor unsaddled the horses of the cavalry and artillery pickets. To this constant strain was added exposure under a burning sun, and there were several fatal cases of sunstroke. But the discipline and spirit of the troops enabled them to overcome difficulties and opposition of every kind, and finally to take by storm the strongest fortress in Central India, with a loss to the rebels of some 5000 killed alone. The casualties in the Central India Field Force in the operations before Jhánsí and the fight at the Betwá were 36 officers and 307 men killed and wounded, besides those who died of sunstroke and fatigue. The victors treated the enemy's women and children with humanity. 'Neither the desperate resistance of the rebels nor the recollection of the revolting and wholesale murders perpetrated the preceding year at that place,' said Sir Hugh Rose, 'could make them forget that, in an English soldier's eyes, the women and children are always spared. So far from hurting, the troops were seen sharing their rations with them.'

The satisfaction of the authorities at the fall of this city fortress was of course great. The Duke of Cambridge wrote to Sir Hugh Rose: 'This operation is highly satisfactory, and it only proves how much can be done with a small force, such as the one under your command, if it is but ably handled. I had always the greatest confidence in your talent and judgment.'

Sir Colin Campbell also congratulated the General

very heartily on all he had accomplished. 'Your operations,' he said, 'have been conducted with much skill, and I have reason to thank you for the manner in which you have executed the difficult tasks assigned to you by the Government of India.'

Sir George Whitlock also sent a message from Bánda: 'Really your motto seems to be *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, whilst my Second Brigade, with their snail's pace, has prevented me leaving this place.'

CHAPTER VII

THE SOUTHERN OPERATIONS (*continued*)

TO THE RECAPTURE OF GWALIOR

LEAVING a small portion of his Second Brigade to garrison Jhání, Sir Hugh Rose marched on April 25th, 1858, with his First Brigade for Kálpi, 102 miles to the north-east. He had hardly started when information came that the Sepoy garrison of Kálpi, reinforced by Valaitis under the Rání of Jhání, and by Tántia Topi with the Gwalior Contingent, and other rebels, had occupied Kúnch (42 miles from Kálpi and between it and Jhání). Kúnch was a difficult place to attack owing to the woods, gardens, and temple enclosures lying round it; and the enemy had strongly fortified the western quarter and the Jhání gate.

Acting on his usual principle, that nothing was so likely to disconcert the rebels as turning their flank and threatening their rear, Sir Hugh Rose resolved to mask the fortified front on the Jhání road and to attack Kúnch in flank. In accordance with these tactics, as well as to avoid a protracted engagement in the fierce heat of the sun, he made a long night march to the left flank, and shortly

after daybreak arrived opposite the west side of Kúnch, in rear of the fort and town; thus turning the strong defences of the Jhánsí gate. After the troops had rested, the artillery opened fire, and the infantry prepared to storm the fort. A wing of the 86th Regiment and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry were thrown into skirmishing order, supported on the flank by detachments of artillery and cavalry; the remainder of the attacking force being formed into a second line. The skirmishers of the Native Infantry, under cover of the guns, cleared the woods, temples, and walled gardens; whilst the British regiment, led by Major Stuart, made a circuit to the left, taking all the obstacles in their front, and cutting the enemy's line in two; thereby, Sir Hugh Rose wrote in his despatch, adding 'another claim to the obligations I owe this regiment for their very distinguished conduct at all times in the field.'

The enemy, seeing their defence thus broken down, and their right completely turned, retired in masses from Kúnch to the extensive plains stretching towards Kálpi, forming a long, irregular line, covered by skirmishers at close intervals. So keen, however, was the pursuit, that they soon became a helpless mob of runaways, losing in the retreat some 600 men besides 15 guns.

During the operations before Kúnch the men of the 71st Highlanders (who had recently joined the force by bullock-train from Bombay) and of the 3rd Europeans dropped down in numbers on the

field from sunstroke. In fact, the sun was a far more deadly enemy than the rebels, for there was no cover. Dooli after dooli was brought into the field hospital, with officers and men suffering from sunstroke, some dead, some prostrate, others laughing or sobbing in delirium. The General himself had fallen three times from sunstroke, but each time forced himself to rally until the victory was won. When the men moved off towards the encamping ground on the Kálpi side of Kúnych, they were completely worn out; the action having lasted from daybreak till 9 o'clock at night, in a heat which was 110° in the shade.

Before marching on to Kálpi, Sir Hugh Rose detached Major Gall with a small force to attack and take the strong fort of Lohári, held by Valaitis, six or seven miles on his left flank. This was done with great gallantry. The fort was too strong to batter with field artillery, and the only entrance was a difficult one, built on the old Maráthá plan of a double gate with a small postern in an angle. Here the 3rd Europeans particularly distinguished themselves. A desperate struggle took place when they got into the first gate. Two officers were severely wounded, and several men killed. A soldier named Whirlpool¹ received no less than nineteen wounds.

¹ He had been mentioned in despatches for saving the lives of two comrades who had fallen wounded from the broken ladders at the siege of Jhánsí. He himself lived to receive the Victoria Cross and sixpence a day beyond his usual pension. Sir Hugh Rose always thought that the name of Whirlpool was assumed, and

'Take care, lads,' he said, as they put him into the dooli, 'and don't shake my head, or else it will come off.'

Writing of the action of Kunch, three days afterwards, Sir Hugh Rose said: 'We should have destroyed the enemy, had not the dreadful heat paralysed the men. Eleven poor fellows were killed outright by the sun, and many more were struck down. I was obliged four times to get off my horse by excessive debility. The doctor poured cold water over me, and gave restoratives, which enabled me to go on again. I do not think I shall stay in India to pass such another torment as 110° in the shade. I have succeeded militarily better than I could have expected, and that is all I wanted.' He also wrote to a relative: 'I took Kunch from the rebels in a heat which cannot be told— 110° in the shade. Owing to God's great mercy to me, I have had thirteen fights, and always won the day—never one check. Your old regiment, the 71st Highlanders, had twelve men struck down in the ranks. Afterwards, near Kálpi, it was 119° in the shade, and 200 men out of less than 400 of the 25th Native Infantry fell out of the ranks, stricken by the sun. I delight in the 71st,' he added, 'and I have such a splendid regiment in the 86th. They go at anything.'

afterwards learnt that the man was a son of Mr. Conker, the postmaster of Dundalk. When the General was in command in Ireland the parents came to thank him for his kindness to their son, who was then in New South Wales.

An urgent message now arrived from the Civil Officer at Kúunch, saying that unless Sir Hugh Rose marched at once to the right bank of the Jumna, Tántia Topi and the Rání at Kálpi, with the Nawáb of Bánda at Nowgong, twenty miles to the south-west of Kálpi, would cut him off, and so prevent him 'giving a hand,' as desired by the Government of India, to Sir Colin Campbell. He accordingly made forced marches towards Kálpi, leaving a small detachment¹ to strike the tents at Kúunch, and to join him as quickly as they could at Guláulí on the Jumna, seven miles from Kálpi.

The troops had now to contend, not only against the rebel army, fighting with all the advantages of superior numbers and knowledge of the ground, but with an Indian sun at its maximum of summer heat. The number of officers and men on the sick list increased daily, and added to the difficulties of transport. There was a scarcity both of water and forage. But obstacles were things that had to be overcome. A check, or worse still, a defeat before Kálpi, in the advanced state of the hot season and with the rains close at hand, while resuscitating rebellion throughout

¹ At one of the halting-places, the General found a party of sick and wounded lying on the ground in their great coats, with their knapsacks under their heads for a pillow. He asked if they had any complaints. 'Complaints, sir,' said the surgeon in charge, 'they haven't a single thing which they would have in an English hospital in camp, at home, or in the field; but,' he added, 'they have no complaints except one, and that is, they cannot march with you to-morrow against the enemy.' The men, raising their heads from their knapsacks, smiled in assent.

India, would have compromised the safety of Cawnpur, and have exposed the extensive line of operations conducted by the Commander-in-Chief to an attack in flank.

For the protection of Kálpi the rebels had constructed elaborate defence works on the main road from Kúnych. Finding it impossible to bring an adequate force against these defences, Sir Hugh Rose determined to break off to the right and to join hands with Brigadier (now Sir George) Maxwell's small force, which had been sent by the Commander-in-Chief to the left bank of the river to co-operate with him. To mislead the enemy, and mask this movement, he directed his Second Brigade to follow up the high road to Kálpi, although its movements were unfortunately paralysed by sickness. Notwithstanding these difficulties, two pontoon rafts, brought with great trouble from Poona, were thrown over the Jumna, and the actual junction with Sir Colin Campbell's army was effected on May 15, 1858. The next few days were spent in skirmishes with the enemy and in preparing for the attack on Kálpi.

By this time sickness had made fearful inroads on the strength of Sir Hugh Rose's column. The superintending surgeon, Dr. Arnott, reported in an official letter that the greater part of the force, officers as well as men, from the General and his staff downwards, were ill from sunstroke; and he declared that if the operations were to be protracted for more than a few days, the entire column would be absolutely

prostrated¹. Lord Canning was so alarmed at these dismal forebodings that he wished to send his Body-guard to the assistance of the Central India Force; but before this and other contemplated reinforcements could be despatched, and before the expiry of the term specified by Dr. Arnott, Kálpi was taken.

So admirable was the conduct of the men under these trials that their Commander wrote of them in his official despatch: 'These noble soldiers, whose successes were never chequered by a reverse, with a discipline which was as enduring as their courage, never proffered one complaint. They fell in their ranks, struck down by the sun, and exhausted by

¹ Writing on May 19th, 1858, Dr. Arnott said:—'In the action before Kúncb of the 7th instant, one regiment, about 420 strong, lost seven men by sunstroke, and on the march to Bándá lost five men and admitted 35 into hospital; and whenever it has been exposed it has suffered very severely. Though the rest of the troops have borne exposure better, their losses have been heavy and their admissions into the hospital very numerous, from the overwhelming effects of a temperature ranging from 109° to 117° in tents, and seldom falling under 100° at night. But to illustrate better the state of health of all ranks, I may mention that we have now 310 Europeans in hospital, having lost in the week 21 by sunstroke; and there is scarcely an officer of the Staff fit for duty. The Quartermaster-General, Clergyman, the Adjutant-General, the Commissariat Officer, the Baggage Master, the Brigade Major and Quartermaster-General and Brigadier of the 2nd Brigade, are all sick. Several of these and many other officers will have to go to Europe, and others will have to go elsewhere for change of climate. Thus paralysed as the force already is, and with the rest enfeebled and worn out by this long and arduous campaign, I cannot refrain from mentioning my apprehensions that should the operations before Kálpi be protracted and the exposure great, the force will be completely prostrated.'

fatigue ; but they would not increase the anxieties of their General or belie their devotion by complaint. No matter how great their exhaustion or how deep their short sleep, they always sprung to my call to arms with the heartiest good-will. To think of yielding or retreating would have been ignominy. All felt that physical strength might fail, but that the spirit and discipline never could. They were often too ill to march, but their devotion made them fight. It is almost superfluous to add that troops animated by so high a sense of duty were sober, orderly, and very respectful to their officers. There was less crime in my camp than in garrison.'

Kálpi is situated on a high rock rising from the Jumna, and is surrounded by miles of deep ravines. Sallying out from their almost impregnable ambuscade, the rebels unceasingly hampered the troops on the left of Sir Hugh Rose's position ; while opposite his right was the army of the Nawáb of Bánda, who, after his defeat by Whitlock (19th April, 1858), joined the rebels at Kálpi, with a serviceable body of cavalry.

Acting upon information that the enemy intended to make a determined attack upon his right, on the morning of May 22nd, Sir Hugh Rose at once strengthened his position there ; and at the same time asked Brigadier Maxwell to send him the Camel Corps, two companies of the 88th Regiment, and some Sikh infantry. Placing himself in the centre of his line, with the Camel Corps under Major (now Lieutenant-General Sir John) Ross, he was ready, on the eventful

day, to meet any emergency ; that is to say, to reinforce the right or left as required. Shortly afterwards, an orderly came from Brigadier Stuart, who was commanding on the right, begging him to come up immediately with reinforcements, as the rebels were debouching from the ravines and were advancing in strength. The General at once started himself with the Camel Corps ; sending orders to the 25th Native Infantry to join him immediately. Dismounting the Camel Sowars, and forming them into line, he took them at the double up the rising ground, from the top of which they saw Brigadier Stuart, sword in hand, protecting his battery of mortars, with the help of his infantry escort. Their strength had been so reduced and weakened by casualties, that there were only seven or eight artillerymen to both mortars¹.

A charge of the Camel Corps soon relieved the position from immediate danger. But the enemy still swarmed out from the ravines, and became closely engaged with the 86th Regiment. The Gwa-

¹ In his graphic account of these operations Colonel Malleon quotes a letter addressed to him by an eye-witness, who wrote : ' Well do I remember that day. Nearly 400 of my regiment—the 86th—were *hors de combat*. The native regiment—the 25th Bengal Native Infantry—were not much better, and thousands of yelling savages were pressing on while we had a river in our rear. We were well nigh beaten when the Camel Corps came up ; and about 150 fresh troops soon turned the tide, and sent the bhanga-fortified enemy to the rightabout again. It was the Camel Corps that virtually saved Sir Hugh Rose's division. The enemy were within twenty yards of our battery and outpost tents, the latter full of men down with sunstroke. Another quarter of an hour and there would have been a massacre.'

lior Sepoys—fine stalwart men in red jackets and white turbans, with white trousers drawn up to the thigh—looked like demons as they advanced, uttering imprecations against the English.

The European troops were hampered by defective ammunition; while their great exertions, and the great heat of the sun, caused numerous sunstrokes. Sir Hugh Rose here received his fifth. Before this happened, however, he had seen at a glance that their defective ammunition rendered the men useless as skirmishers, and that it was no longer profitable to employ them as such. Closing his men, therefore, in double time on their centre, he ordered them to charge the enemy, who, unable to withstand the shock, fell back in confusion to their ravines, suffering heavy losses as they fled.

In the meantime Sir Hugh Rose heard that his left had completely succeeded in driving back into Kálpi the force under the Rání of Jhání and Ráo Sáhib. The battle was won, and he might attack Kálpi itself the next morning before daybreak.

But the enemy, whose *morale* was shattered by their defeat, had already begun to evacuate the place. In fact Kálpi had been won¹ by the general action on the banks of the Jumna, and was next day occupied without further fighting. Vast quantities of stores, ammunition, guns, &c., were found in the fort, which

¹ In justice to a gallant officer it must here be said that to the efficient co-operation of Brigadier Maxwell, Sir Hugh Rose owed much of his success in the difficult operations before Kálpi.

was a central depôt for the rebel troops stationed south of the Jumna, and between that river and the Ganges.

When explaining to the Commander-in-Chief his reasons for calling on Brigadier Maxwell to assist him, for which he had been censured, Sir Hugh Rose stated (May 26, 1858) that he was influenced by the wish to effect the rapid capture of Kálpi. He had no plan of the fort and only a faulty Ordnance map to consult. 'When I came near Kálpi,' he wrote, 'I found that it was surrounded by a belt of ravines about two miles in breadth, as difficult ground as could be seen, and that to attack the fort I must force the ravines, of which the enemy had entrenched the entrance, and afterwards the town which surrounds the fort. I always thought and hoped that I should have one good fight with the rebels for Kálpi; and that if they lost it, they would evacuate the town and fort. After being beaten at Kúnch, they would have evacuated Kálpi had not the Nawáb of Bándá reinforced them with a large body of troops and induced them to stay. But whether the attack of Kálpi was to be determined by one or by many days operations, I felt the conviction that I required reinforcements on account of the sickly state of my force, and the great strength of the ground defended by entrenchments. All the old Indian officers of my force say that they never felt, not even in Sind, so bad a heat as that of the Jumna. The men affected by it had apoplexy, violent crying fits, and lost their heads and sight.

Brigadier Stuart and all his staff were on the sick list. Out of 36 men of the 14th Light Dragoons who went from Guláulí to reinforce a party escorting supplies and threatened by the enemy, 17, after being out only three hours, came home in doolis. Out of less than 400 men of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry whom I took to reinforce the Second Brigade, 200 fell out of the number after two hours.'

Sir Hugh Rose added: 'The Sepoys having sworn by the Jumna, and full of opium, made a fierce attack on my camp. The first on May 20th was only on our right. It was of course beaten back; but I did not advance because I knew the enemy's tactics were to expose us as much as possible to the sun, and I had made arrangements with Maxwell to attack Kálpi on the 22nd after he had shelled the enemy's defences in and in advance of the town. The second attack was on May 22nd. It was a general one and by their whole force. They made a real and violent attack on our right, and a strong feint against our centre and left. Hearing a heavy fire on our right, I sent to ask Brigadier Stuart if I should send him any of the Camel Corps. He asked for 100. I went myself with 200 to his support. I found him with very few men, half of whose rifles would not go off on account of bad ammunition¹; and 40 men were lying close to

¹ It was a proof of the inadequacy of musketry instruction at that time that the troops, having been trained to fire at so short a distance, fired generally with a bad aim and too high. The enemy's casualties were consequently few, and those chiefly from the bayonet. The men had not, moreover, been trained either

him struck down by the sun. The enemy were close up to his two nine-pounder guns ; and Brigadier Stuart was so hard pressed that he was on the point of ordering the Artillerymen to draw their swords and defend their guns. I ordered the Rifles and 80th to charge with their bayonets, which young Ross did most gallantly and effectually, driving the enemy back for half a mile. The whole line then advanced ; and they ran in every direction, pursued and cut up by the infantry, cavalry, and artillery. . . . The rebels are completely down and discouraged. In the pursuit they threw away their arms and made no resistance. Among other guns we took ten horse-artillery guns of which they are so proud. We found a subterranean magazine of ammunition in the fort, two or three excellent foundries and gun manufactories. The quantity of powder and ordnance stores in the magazine is extraordinary.'

In a general order to the force, thanking them for their devotion and discipline, Sir Hugh Rose said amongst other things : ' When you first marched I told you, as British soldiers, you had more than enough of the courage for the work which was before

to fire at an enemy on a high elevation, nor at an enemy on a bank across broad ravines. A defect in the ammunition supplied to the force also made itself felt. From the mistake of not concentrating the whole strength of the powder in the charge by a round ring at the bottom, which gave expansion to the leaden bullet, the cone was only blown off by the explosion ; and the shell of the bullet stuck in the rifle. This happened to all the skirmishers, to the distraction and danger of the men.

you, but that courage without discipline was of no avail; and I exhorted you to let discipline be your watchword. You have attended to my orders. In hardships, in temptations, and in dangers, you have obeyed your General and have never left your ranks. You have fought against the strong, and you have protected the rights of the weak and defenceless, of foes as well as of friends. I have seen you in the heat of the combat preserve and place children out of harm's way. This is the discipline of Christian soldiers, and this it is which has brought you triumphant from the shores of Western India to the waters of the Jumna.'

Sir Hugh Rose himself was prostrated with sickness. He had had three attacks of the sun at Kunch, a fourth in an intermediate reconnoissance, and a fifth in the general action before Kálpi. As the remedies administered to enable him to rise again, ride, and retain command in the field were necessarily strong, whilst his duties became more onerous from all his staff being sick or ailing, he became quite overborne with fatigue and anxiety. The condition of the force was described by an eye-witness (Dr. Lowe), who wrote: 'The General was very ill; his chief of the staff, General Wetherall, was in a raging fever; his Quarter-master-General, Captain Macdonald, worn out; the Chaplain of the Force had lost his reason, and was apparently sinking fast.'

The capture of Kálpi completed the plan of the campaign, which the Government of India had drawn

up for the Central Indian Force. Marching from Mhow in January, 1858, that force in five months had traversed Central India, had beaten the enemy in thirteen general actions and sieges, and had captured some of the strongest forts in India. Lord Canning telegraphed to Sir Hugh Rose on May 24th, 1858: 'Your capture of Kálpi has crowned a series of brilliant and uninterrupted successes. I thank you and your brave soldiers with all my heart.'

Sir Colin Campbell had decided that after the fall of Kálpi the Central India Field Force was to be broken up, and to be distributed at Gwalior and Jhánsí. The necessary arrangements were taken in hand; and Sir Hugh Rose, worn out with fatigue and sunstroke, was advised by his medical officer to return at once to Bombay. But before he could start, intelligence came which upset all his plans and created a sensation throughout India hardly inferior to that caused by the first mutinies. The rebel army under Tántia Topi and the Rání of Jhánsí, the report said, whilst retreating across the Chambal river, had changed their route, and had attacked the Mahárájá Sindhia at Bahádurpur, nine miles from Gwalior; whereupon his Highness' troops of all arms, with the exception of a few of his bodyguard, had treacherously gone over *en masse* to the enemy.

The Mahárájá, it seems, had called out his troops to co-operate with Lord Clyde's army against the rebels who were retreating into Rohilkhand; but when he paraded them in order to march, they

mutinied to a man. After a brave endeavour to assert his authority, he was forced by the fire of his own artillery and the combined attacks of his troops and of the rebel army to fly to Agra, which place he reached with difficulty, accompanied by only one or two attendants. The rebels had meanwhile entered Gwalior and *looted* the treasury and jewels; amongst these latter being a famous pearl necklace taken from the Portuguese regalia. The garrison of the fort at the same time opened its gate to the rebels; and from 50 to 60 fine guns (comprising horse, field, and siege artillery), as well as an arsenal with abundance of warlike stores, fell into the enemy's hands. Thus the rebels who had fled a disorderly and helpless mob from Kálpi, now found themselves provided with abundance of money, with a serviceable park of artillery, with *matériel* of war, and with Sindhia's army as their allies. To render the situation still more embarrassing, Gwalior fell into rebel hands at the most unfavourable time of the year for military operations; on the eve, that is, of the great rains, and when the heat of summer was at its maximum.

This serious news reached Sir Hugh Rose just after his leave had been granted. A few days' rest had revived him and he at once telegraphed to the Governor-General to say that he would be glad to take command of the force ordered to recapture the city and fortress. Lord Canning thanked him warmly for this generous devotion to the public service, and accepted the offer. At the same time, Brigadier-General

(the late Field-Marshal Lord) Napier, who had been appointed to succeed Sir Hugh Rose on his departure to Bombay, now with the generosity which always characterised him, told Lord Canning that he would be delighted to serve as second in command; and Sir Hugh Rose was glad to have so able an officer to assist him in the operations.

Starting on June 5th, Sir Hugh reached Bahádurpur, the scene of Sindhia's defeat, on June 16th. The march was attended with considerable difficulties on account of the absence of roads, the want of maps, rivers difficult to be crossed, and heat so intense that the thermometer on one occasion stood at 130° when it broke. Sir Hugh Rose's plan of operations was to invest Gwalior as closely as its great extent would allow, and then to attack on the weakest side; the investing troops cutting off the escape of the rebels. He hoped that the defeat of the enemy, outside and inside the city, would be followed, as at Kálpi, by the easy capture of the fortress. A scientific siege of the fortress would have prolonged the operations far into the rainy season. With great trouble he had ascertained that the weakest side of Gwalior, and consequently the best suited for an attack, was the east, where the city was commanded by high hills. Here, too, Gwalior might be captured almost out of range of the guns in the fort.

Placing the Haidarábád Contingent in a position to cut off the retreat of the rebels to the South, and directing Brigadier Smith with the Rájputána Field

Force to move from Sipri to Kotah-ki-Sarai, about seven miles to the east of Gwalior, Sir Hugh Rose, on June 16th, marched with Brigadier Stuart's column and the small force he had brought from Kálpi against the Morár cantonments. These cantonments, which lay about five miles from Gwalior, were reported to be in the enemy's possession.

A close reconnoissance showed that the side of the cantonments fronting his force was occupied by strong bodies of cavalry, and that with them were guns and a considerable number of infantry. Feeling certain that his men would be reinvigorated rather than fatigued by an immediate action, and that the *morale* of the enemy would be damped by his attacking them unexpectedly after a long night's march,—for he had only reached Bahádurpur at 6 a.m. on June 16th and marched against Morár the same day,—he resolved to strike at once, and placed the troops in order of battle.

The advance, covered by the Haidarábád cavalry, was made in two lines in *échelon* from the right. The first line, under the General himself, consisted of a field battery and siege guns in the centre, the 86th Regiment on the right, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry on the left, and the 14th Light Dragoons on each flank. The second line, under Brigadier-General Napier, was placed in *échelon* on his left; the left was 'refused,' as the ravines in this direction were full of ambuscaded troops and such a formation would enable the whole force to wheel rapidly to the left if necessary.

Patrols of cavalry were at the same time sent to search the hills on the left and rear.

As the troops advanced, the enemy in the ravines were forced to show themselves by Brigadier-General Napier, and a sharp action took place between them and the 71st Highlanders, who behaved admirably, routing the enemy with great slaughter. In Sir Hugh Rose's own words, 'the commander of the second line merited my warmest thanks for his skilful management of it.' On this occasion, Lieutenant Neave, of the 71st Highlanders, who led a charge against the enemy and fell mortally wounded, particularly distinguished himself; and a sergeant and private of the regiment obtained the Victoria Cross for personal bravery. The success was completed by an admirable pursuit of the rebels by a wing of the 14th Light Dragoons.

The capture of the Morár cantonments had good results. It was the first defeat which the combined forces of the Kálpi and Gwalior rebels had sustained; and it enabled Sir Hugh Rose to at once open up communications with Brigadier Smith at Kotah-ki-Sarai, seven miles to the east, and to reconnoitre Gwalior from that side.

In the meantime, Brigadier Smith had a sharp encounter with the enemy and was able partially to occupy the heights to the east of Gwalior, in spite of determined opposition. In resisting a gallant charge of a squadron of the 8th Hussars under Captain Heneage,—when the Hussars passed right through

the enemy's camp, carrying everything before them—the Rání of Jhání received her death wound; and the spot was afterwards shown where her body was burnt with great ceremony¹. Thus fell 'the bravest and best military leader of the rebels' at the early age of twenty years.

Sir Hugh Rose's reconnoissance of Gwalior satisfied him that the information on which he had decided to attack was trustworthy. He could not leave Morár, however, without adequate protection. Brigadier-General Napier was accordingly posted at the cantonments to guard the position, with instructions to pursue the enemy when they retreated; while Sir Hugh himself, in order to complete his communications with Brigadier Smith and to attack Gwalior from the east, marched on the afternoon of June 18th towards Kotah-ki-Sarai. The march was very harassing, 100 men of the 86th Regiment alone being compelled by the sun to fall out and go into doolis. There was clearly no time to lose, and the enemy had to be attacked at once. A deep ditch surrounded the high hills which overlooked Gwalior; but notwithstanding this obstacle, the troops quickly gained possession of the heights to the east of the town, and came in full view of it. A large party of the rebels,

¹ This Indian Joan of Arc was dressed in a red jacket and trousers and white turban. She wore Sindhia's celebrated pearl necklace which she had taken from his treasury. As she lay mortally wounded in her tent, she ordered these ornaments to be distributed among her troops. The whole rebel army mourned her loss.



some 10,000 men, were seen drawn up on the parade square, with numerous cavalry and two 18-pounders, besides other guns.

Brigadier Smith having come up in the meantime and turned the enemy's left, Sir Hugh Rose sent Cornet (now Major-General) Goldsworthy, 8th Hussars, a 'gallant and intelligent officer,' for the Field Battery and Horse Artillery. The gunners soon opened a successful fire, which killed and disabled a large number of the enemy and put the rest to flight.

The troops now entered the town without difficulty; and, marching up the main street, took possession of Sindhia's palace¹, with the intention of capturing the fort in the morning. Brigadier Smith co-operated with good effect on the left near the palace of Phúl Bágh, which he took, killing numbers of the enemy and capturing several guns.

¹ This was effected without bloodshed through the useful interposition of Captain (now Sir Richard) Meade. He happened to be well known to the Gwalior men, and gallantly volunteered to go forward alone to the palace court-yard, which was full of armed and excited soldiery, to persuade them to submit peaceably, and to give up the palace. They fortunately recognised him, and after some delay, acted on his advice. Captain Meade came back unhurt to the General and reported that the force could move forward. The next day Sindhia returned, overjoyed and overcome, to his capital, and insisted upon giving Sir Hugh Rose a dinner in his palace, attended by his old servants, who seemed overwhelmed with pleasure. He was afterwards anxious to present a medal with his device, a serpent, to all the officers and men of the Central India Field Force, together with six months' batta. Lord Canning approved the presentation of the medal, but permission was refused by the Home Government.

In the early morning (June 19th) Sir Hugh Rose moved with General Stuart's Brigade to the left of the Gwalior Rock, where it was not precipitate; covering the movement by sending the 25th Native Infantry, well supported, round the same sort of ground on the right, whence they could scramble up the rock above the gateway of the fort. Here Lieutenant Rose, son of Rose of Kilravock, commanding the advanced skirmishers, caught sight of a depression of the ground where the second gate into the fort was situated. Collecting his skirmishers into line, he stormed it, effecting a capture as successful as it was bold; but paying for his gallantry with his life.

Sir Hugh Rose now sent an order to Brigadier-General Napier to pursue the enemy as far and as closely as he could. This Napier did most effectually¹.

¹ Brigadier Napier wrote to Sir Hugh Rose as follows:—'Camp Jáora-Alipur. I trust you have received my letters dated 21st, informing you of our having attacked and dispelled the enemy and captured 25 guns. An elephant and some carts and tents were also taken, and a Government postbag full of letters for your force. I moved yesterday by Sirauda, intending to have followed the enemy's traces to Sabulgarh; but I found that, from all accounts I could gather, their dispersion was more complete even than I had believed, whilst the leading fugitives had already passed Sabulgarh. I found the greatest difficulty in getting supplies, the natives of the force having been without *atta* for several days; the *banyas* had deserted their villages, and very small quantities were procurable from the best disposed villages: I have no doubt I could have found more, but of course tried to avoid embroiling Sindhia with his subjects by any coercive measures. Under these difficulties, and with the troops knocking up much from the intense heat, I have thought it useless to advance further and have brought back my column to Jáora-

Twenty-five pieces of artillery were the fruits of his pursuit, as well as the total dispersion of the enemy.

Thus ended on June 20th, 1858, the taking of Gwalior. The operations were briefly summed up by Sir Hugh Rose in a despatch to the Government of India, dated October 13th, 1858, in which the General wrote:—‘As the commander of the troops engaged, it is my duty to say that although a most arduous campaign had impaired the health and strength of my force, their discipline, devotion, and courage remained unvarying and unshaken; enabling them to make a very rapid march in summer-heat to Gwalior; fight and gain two actions on the road, one at Morár Cantonments, the other at Kotah-ki-Sarai; arrive, from great distances and by bad roads, at their posts before Gwalior on the day appointed, the 19th of June; and on that same day carry by assault all the enemy’s positions on strong heights and in most difficult ground; taking one battery after another, 27 pieces of artillery in the action, 25 in the pursuit, besides the guns in the fort, the old city, the new city, and finally the rock of Gwalior, held to be one of the most important and strongest fortresses in India. I

Alipur. Captain Ross’s detachment is here in charge of the guns captured. I send in an express for your further orders. I believe about 300 of the enemy have been killed; the country people say about 500; but the rebels dispersed over the whole face of the country, throwing away their arms and accoutrements. I had 20 cases of sunstroke more or less severe, yesterday, in the Horse Artillery. I never felt anything like the heat. Sindhia’s faithful Sowars have just made their appearance, and I employ them to have a relay between this and Gwalior for your answer.’

marched on June 9th from Kálpi, and on the 19th of the same month the Gwalior State was restored to their prince.'

The Government of India was more than satisfied at the result; and immediate steps were taken to make known its approval. A telegram from the President in Council was sent to all stations, at Lord Canning's desire, requesting that 'the news may be spread through every part of the Deccan, and all Southern and Eastern India, and that the restoration of our brave and faithful ally Sindhia through British arms may be loudly proclaimed.' At the same time, a public notification was issued at Calcutta, ordering a 'royal salute' to be fired at every large town in India to celebrate the event.

The feeling amongst Anglo-Indians generally was fairly reflected in a letter written by a correspondent at Gwalior to the public press in June, 1858. After mentioning that Sir Hugh Rose was about to leave for Bombay, to take command of the Poona Division, the writer said: 'His career has been a glorious one, and is worthily crowned by the capture of Gwalior and the utter defeat of the rebels here. His position is the proudest that any General has occupied in this country for many a long day.'

Nor were his services forgotten at home. He was created a G.C.B. and appointed to the Colonelcy of the 45th Regiment. His name was also mentioned in the vote of thanks, passed in both Houses of Parliament, to the troops engaged in the Mutiny Campaign; on which

occasion high praise was bestowed on his skill and gallantry by the Earl of Derby, the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Palmerston, and other distinguished statesmen.

It is impossible, however, to overlook the keen disappointment that was felt in the Service when the troops of the Central India Field Force were not only forbidden to accept the silver star which the Mahárájá Sindhia desired to give them, but received no *batta*, and no decoration, for a series of brilliant successes untarnished by a defeat or retreat, except the general clasp that was given promiscuously to all the troops in Central India, some of whom had done little or nothing. To crown all, the Central India Field Force was debarred, by a special pleading, founded on some Admiralty ruling respecting the blockade of ports by ships of war, from participating in the prize-money found at Bándá and Kirwi; although the right of the Force to receive a share had been frankly acknowledged by the Government of India, by the Commander-in-Chief in India, and by the military authorities and head of the Government at home. Sir Hugh Rose himself never asked for and never received any pension; and, his means at that time being small, the loss of some £30,000 as his own personal share in the coveted prize-money was a serious one.

In bringing to a close the story of the Southern operations, it may not be improper to quote the remarks of an impartial critic¹, who writes: 'It seldom happens

¹ Prichard's 'India.'

that a great war or a serious political crisis fails in bringing forward the man of the time, whose genius lacked only the opportunity of development. The campaign in India of 1857-58 was no exception to the rule. Far in advance of any of the other commanders in genius, tact, judgment, energy, and that unflinching determination which has won for England so many victories by sea and land, the character of Sir Hugh Rose, to any one who studies the military history of those times, stands out prominently. If his services have been barely rewarded, they have never been appreciated, because not thoroughly understood in England. In India it is generally believed some official jealousy threw into the shade what was undoubtedly one of the most brilliant achievements that the military history of any country in ancient or modern times has recorded. Important as were the operations under Lord Clyde in Oudh and Rohilkhand, they would have been profitless, so far as putting an end to the war is concerned, had it not been for the vigour, determination, and skill of his lieutenant; and fortunate it was for us that the tremendous task of recovering Central India, from the borders of the Western Presidency up to the Ganges, had been entrusted to a commander of Sir Hugh Rose's stamp. Had it been made over to a less able man, the result would have been the transference of the seat of war from Oudh and Rohilkhand to Central India; where in a most difficult country, surrounded by independent States only half inclined to side with us, the campaign,

instead of being closed in 1859, would have probably gone on two years longer. Had all Sir Hugh Rose's previous service been passed in India, had he made the country and the character of its inhabitants his study for years, he could not have shown greater knowledge of the most effective method of dealing with the rebellion. With a small but well-appointed force, a tithe of that with which Lord Clyde confronted an enemy scarcely less formidable, he marched in one career of conquest from the Western Presidency right up to Kálpi on the Jumna, captured fortresses and walled towns, driving the enemy before him, fighting battles against enormous odds with one hand, while, with the other, he kept open his communications, or, as at Jhánsí, maintained a siege. He understood the immense importance in Asiatic warfare of keeping the ball rolling. He allowed the enemy no breathing time. The consequence was that, formidable as they were in numbers, in character, in desperation, in resources, in position, and in the sympathy of the population, they disappeared before the British troops as a row of houses built up with a pack of cards falls at the touch of the hand. Such an unchecked career of conquest resembles that of the Israelitish invaders of Palestine. It was an achievement scarcely less glorious than the Retreat of the Ten Thousand.'

Having made over the command of the Central India Field Force to Brigadier-General Napier, Sir Hugh Rose bade farewell to his troops and set out on June 29, 1858, to rejoin his command at Poona, where

he rapidly regained his health. On all sides he received kindnesses and congratulations. 'People of all classes,' he wrote August 18, 1858, 'continue to give me all sorts of ovations, but public favour is a very fitful thing and may change in a contrary direction at any moment. I am all ready however, thank God, for another campaign, although from all accounts I think there will not be one.'

Only two anxieties, at this period, weighed on his mind. One was owing to the delay in the submission of his reports and despatches; which delay not only elicited a reproof from Government, but also helped to postpone a proper appreciation of the value of his campaign. The other anxiety was the escape to Southern India and the vain and continued pursuit of the ubiquitous Tántia Topi. The delay of the despatches was much to be regretted, and was almost unaccountable. Judging from the correspondence which passed at the time, it arose partly from the labour which it cost to place on record an accurate account of the rapid events that had taken place; and partly from the fact that during the campaign he had no plans of forts or positions, and was therefore unable to undertake any operation without reconnoitring localities himself, being often—one might almost say daily—fourteen and fifteen hours in the saddle on that kind of duty. As regards Tántia Topi, it was not until the spring of 1859 that his hiding-place was betrayed by an associate, and he was captured by Meade and hanged at Sipri on April 18th of that year.

On March 29th, 1859, Sir Hugh Rose was appointed to the Command-in-Chief of the Bombay Army. At the end of a few months he was transferred (June 4th, 1860), on the departure of Lord Clyde for England, to the Commander-in-Chiefship of India. This appointment greatly pleased him, and he wrote (Sept. 19th, 1860): 'As a proof of confidence and approval, my being made Commander-in-Chief is more gratifying than a peerage, especially when the Indian Army has to be reorganised. I will endeavour to bear with humility my elevation, which I am convinced I owe more to the signal mercy of God than to my own merits. I feel that with His blessing I can do an immense amount of good; but I shall fail in doing what I ought to do, if I give way to anything like feelings of pride.'

After holding this command for five years Sir Hugh Rose returned to England, was raised to the peerage with the title of Baron Strathnairn of Strathnairn and Jhánsí, and was subsequently promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal. He died suddenly at Paris on the 16th of October, 1885, at the age of eighty-four, and now lies in the family graveyard of the Priory Church of Christchurch, Hants.

CHAPTER VIII

RECONSTRUCTION

AS may readily be imagined, even by readers who are unfamiliar with the details of military administration in India, it was impossible that the defeat of the rebels in the field should be followed by a tranquil restoration of the *status quo ante*. Bloodshed and disorder had given way to peace and to measures of reorganisation, but it required all the wisdom of the conquerors to reconstruct institutions which had been shaken and discredited; besides dealing with a local European army which, after splendid service in the field, tarnished the glory of its success by a so-called 'white' mutiny, and with a disbanded Sepoy force which was alike despised and detested. Everything was more or less in a state of transition. Men of Indian experience vied with each other in efforts to change everything, to replace everything; nor is it extraordinary that the improved systems and new organisations, eventually adopted, were often found to be of doubtful utility.

The reformers of one great school contended that to be ready for offence was the only way to avoid being

attacked; and that if the peace of India was to be safeguarded from internal commotion and foreign aggression, the army must be made strong enough to overawe enemies either within or without its boundaries. They accordingly advocated large increases in the permanent British Army stationed in the country; the formation of a powerful Navy; a wholesale reduction of the Native Army, which was best fitted, they argued, for police duties; an entire rearmament of batteries, forts, and fortified positions; and a complete remodelling of all civil and military institutions.

Another school of experts would have none of these things. We should hold India, they contended, not by the sword, but by winning the love and affection of conquered races, and by inviting all classes to take a larger share in the civil and military government of the country. There was much to be said in favour of both schools. The arguments of each were submitted to the verdict of public opinion with considerable ability and earnestness; and were in due course recorded in those ponderous Blue Books and voluminous reports which are the delight of Governments and Royal Commissions of the present century.

To make a proper use of the opportunity was more difficult than to win the battle. For there was an East India Company to dispose of; a Company which boldly asserted that, as a governing body, it was 'not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in act ever known among mankind.'

There were, moreover, the officers of a disbanded army whose interests had to be studied, albeit their ignorance of the men they commanded, and their unfitness for ordinary military command, in too many cases, had precipitated the disaster which had left them without regiments. And not to speak of the varied questions of moment that arose in connection with the European portion of the Company's forces, there was above all the necessity of forming a new Native Army on the ruins of an old one whose traditions, after all, had been honourable, whose service up to the date of the Mutiny had been invaluable, and whose place it was not easy to fill.

On Lord Canning principally devolved the irksome duty of reconciling incompatible opinion, and of reorganising the defences of India. The Governor-General had borne with calmness the brunt of the Mutiny. He was fearless of responsibility, he had a considerable insight into character, and he had attained, during the time of trial, an unusual degree of military prescience and instinct, which made itself felt on occasions when he had to control with his intelligence and judgment the barrack-yard knowledge of some of the barrack-yard soldiers who carried out his orders.

India was still feeling the shock from which it had barely recovered; and Lord Canning, therefore, felt that while he could afford to be pacific, he could not afford to be weak. We had originally fought our way to power in the East; and it was now for us to show

ourselves capable of retaining the great position that had been recommitted, as it were, into our hands by Providence. The time was coming when it would be our duty to think less of ruling by the sword, and more of securing the goodwill and affection of the people. But that time had not yet arrived, and the Indian Government had therefore to pay almost exclusive attention, for several years after the Mutiny, to military measures and military precautions.

The general population and educated classes in the British provinces had stood aloof from the revolt, and the closer incorporation of their interests with the Ruling Power formed part of the scheme. But territories that for a thousand years had been held by the sword, and the great kingdoms of Oudh and Haidarábád, the Maráthá States, and the Punjab, which had been established since the rise of British power, must still, it was rightly considered, be held by a sword firmly grasped. These were the sentiments that actuated the minds of Indian administrators during the eventful years of change and reconstruction which followed the suppression of the Mutiny.

They were years of destruction as well as of construction. The first institution to be abolished was the East India Company itself. However useful in earlier generations, a dual government had resulted disastrously in divided responsibilities ; and there was no other alternative open but to replace the Company's depreciated authority by the sceptre of the Queen. Accordingly, after an existence of some two and a

half centuries, the East India Company was buried decently and in order in the autumn of 1858; and the Queen's Government assumed control of the administration. The change was formally accomplished by the Act for the better government of India, passed on August 2, 1858; and on November 1, it was announced in a noble and heart-stirring proclamation addressed by the Sovereign to her Indian subjects.

After calling upon all subjects to bear true allegiance to the Crown, and nominating Lord Canning to be first Viceroy and Governor-General, the Royal Proclamation said: 'We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honorable East India Company are by Us accepted and will be scrupulously maintained, and We look for a like observance on their part. We desire no extensions of Our present territorial possessions; and, while We will permit no aggression upon Our dominions or Our rights to be attempted with impunity, We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as Our own; and we desire that they, as well as Our own subjects, should enjoy prosperity, and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government. We hold ourselves bound to the natives of Our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all Our other

subjects ; and those obligations, by the blessing of God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. Firmly relying Ourselves on the truth of Christianity and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, We disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose Our convictions on any of Our subjects. We declare it to be Our Royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances ; but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of law ; and We do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under Us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of Our subjects on pain of Our highest displeasure. And it is Our further will that, so far as may be, Our subjects of whatever race or creed be freely or impartially admitted to offices in Our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge. We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and We desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State ; and We will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, ways, and customs of India. We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and

led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; We desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.'

We now come to the measures of military re-organisation undertaken after the Mutiny. Masses of Reports so dear to Indian administrators were collected in India; while a Royal Commission was issued in England, to decide, for good or for evil, the future destiny of the Indian Army. This Commission recommended the abolition of the local European Army, and its amalgamation with the so-called 'Queen's Army.' Their proposals were accepted, and the European troops of the Company's forces, numbering about 14,000 officers and men, ceased to have a separate existence. The Artillery became Royal Artillery, the Cavalry became the 19th, 20th, and 21st Hussars, and the Infantry were formed into regiments of the Line numbered from 101 to 109.

This transference of the Company's Europeans was not unattended with disturbance. Many regretted, and still regret, the change. The European soldiers, led astray by evil advisers, and resenting what they regarded as a breach of faith on the part of Government, displayed a spirit of insubordination which, weakly dealt with in its birth-throes by the military authorities, grew into the so-called 'white mutiny.' The measures taken for its suppression

were effective; nor could the movement arrest the progress of reform.

Changes rapidly followed one upon another. The European officers of the old Native Army and those of the Company's European troops who did not accept service in the new Royal Regiments, formed with freshly recruited Native soldiers the new Indian Army. This army was enlisted for general service, and reconstructed on what is known as the irregular system; a system somewhat severely applied and with doubtful results to the Native cavalry and infantry of all the three Presidencies. The levies which had been raised during the Mutiny were formed into Line regiments or disbanded, and, as we shall see presently, the Native Army was largely reduced.

The necessity for providing for the large number of officers whose regiments no longer existed gave the military authorities much concern during this anxious period. The interests of the officers conflicted in some measure with those of the public service; and a not altogether successful compromise was arrived at which resulted, in 1861, in the formation of the Indian Staff Corps. The principle on which the old Company's army was officered had no doubt been faulty, inasmuch as it led to the practice of detaching from regiments the best officers to spend the rest of their service in civil duties unconnected with a military career. But the new system was equally faulty, inasmuch as it enabled young officers to abandon a military career almost at the outset

for civil employment, and yet to rise under the Staff Corps rules at fixed periods of years to the higher military ranks, without the slightest pretence of military service, and to retire eventually on 'Colonel's allowances,' which represented a pension even in excess of that given to any Civil servant. In fact the whole system of the Staff Corps was unsound. The event proved that the Royal Commissioners would have acted more wisely had they listened, in 1859, to the advice of the Duke of Cambridge, who, foreseeing the evils of the Staff Corps system, strongly urged the establishment of a general list for the promotion of officers.

Amid all these varied changes and complications the veteran Lord Clyde took a well-earned rest; and bending his steps homeward, handed over the chief military command in India, on June 4, 1860, to Sir Hugh Rose. There could not have been a better selection on the part of the Queen's Government for so difficult a post; and no one rejoiced in it more sincerely than Lord Clyde himself, although it did not altogether accord at the moment with his own personal views. One of the first duties which Sir Hugh Rose set before himself, after taking over the chief command, was to improve the discipline of the English Army in India, which, from the effects of the Mutiny and the long campaign consequent on it, was in a lax condition. This evil was especially apparent amongst the Company's old regiments known as 'European,' in contradistinction to the 'Royal' army. The prevailing discontent at length

culminated in open mutinous conduct on the part of a European regiment at Dinápur; and Sir Hugh Rose, finding it impossible to allay by ordinary methods this spirit of insubordination, was forced to warn the army at large that he intended to take serious notice of the next case that came before him.

Such a case occurred in the 5th European Regiment. Private Johnson disobeyed a superior officer, and for this was found guilty and sentenced to be shot. The Commander-in-Chief resolved, much against his own personal feeling of compassion, to enforce the sentence. In doing so he wrote in a General Order (November 8th, 1860): 'His Excellency's regret that he is compelled to enforce the sentence is most sincere. But that regret is diminished when he reflects that the present example is necessary for the good of the State, that it is an act of mercy to all misguided soldiers who may be tempted to follow the fatal example of the 5th Regiment, which has caused sorrow and indignation throughout the army.' The execution of the sentence was followed by the disbandment of the regiment.

Another matter which Sir Hugh Rose saw to be of vital importance to the European soldier in India, was the provision of some employment for him in the weary hours of cantonment life. With this object, and with the cordial support of the supreme Government, he made arrangements for the maintenance of workshops, regimental institutions, and soldiers' gardens, which, after fair trial, proved extremely beneficial,

and were soon afterwards adopted at all places garrisoned by the British Army at home and abroad.

While paying attention to the British portion of the army in India, Sir Hugh Rose did not forget the Native regiments; some of which, and particularly the Native Irregular Cavalry, are now second to no troops in the world for discipline, efficiency, and good conduct. It was his constant endeavour to make the army of India not only effective as a fighting machine, but perfect in interior economy and discipline.

In April, 1865, after five years' tenure of the post, Sir Hugh Rose relinquished the chief command, amidst much regret and many valued expressions of goodwill on the part both of officers and men. One of the most gratifying tokens of this feeling was given at a farewell entertainment at Simla, on September 27th, 1864, when Sir Robert Napier (the late Lord Napier of Magdala), for whom Sir Hugh had a warm admiration and regard, said: 'Never has the army of India had a chief more earnestly solicitous to ensure its efficiency than Sir Hugh Rose; never, I believe, has the army of India been in a more efficient condition than it is at the present moment; never has the army of India had a chief whom it would have followed to the field, against a foe worthy of it, with fuller confidence of success than this army would feel under its present Commander-in-Chief.'

On his arrival in England, Sir Hugh Rose was appointed by the Duke of Cambridge to be Commander of the forces in Ireland. The *Times* of the day (May 22,

1865), welcomed the veteran home, 'after a career which would have entitled a Roman general to a triumph.'

Having given this somewhat imperfect sketch of the changes in the Indian Army directly brought about by the events of the Mutiny, it may not be out of place to carry our thoughts backwards, by tracing briefly the rise of the military forces of the three Presidencies, in order that the difference between our military position under the Company and under the Queen may be clearly appreciated. It must be remembered that, for military and administrative purposes, British India has up to the present time been divided into three great political sections—Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; and that the Native Army of India has always consisted of three portions corresponding to the three Presidencies. This separation into three distinct armies was the natural consequence of the original foundation of separate settlements and factories in India; each of which retains to the present day its own separate history and traditions.

Of the three Presidencies, Madras is the oldest. The first armed force in this Presidency was the little garrison of Armagon on the Coromandel Coast, consisting of 12 guns and 28 soldiers. In 1644 Fort St. George was built and garrisoned by 100 soldiers, and in 1653 Madras became a Presidency. In 1748 the various independent companies of factory guards at settlements on the coast were consolidated into the Madras European Regiment. In the following year

Clive, with only 200 soldiers and 300 Sepoys, seized and held Arcot, the capital of the Karnátik, and on three several occasions defeated the troops of the Nawáb and their French auxiliaries.

From this period we may date the first military power of Madras. In 1754, a Royal regiment, the 39th Foot, was sent out to Madras for the first time, to be followed, four years afterwards, by three other Royal regiments. In 1784 the number of the Native troops in Madras had risen to 34,000.

In regard to Bengal, it appears that in 1650 the English traders in that part of India were restricted to a military establishment of an ensign and 90 men. Shortly afterwards, this little corps was reinforced from Madras by 'a corporal of approved fidelity and 20 soldiers.' At the battle of Plassey a century later (June 23, 1757), the force under Clive consisted of the 39th Foot and some 3000 Madras Sepoys; the defeated army numbering about 70,000 men.

The island of Bombay, as is well known, formed part of the marriage portion received by Charles II with the Infanta of Portugal, and in 1662 the Bombay regiment of Europeans was raised to defend the place. In 1668 the island was granted to the East India Company; and in 1708 Bombay became a Presidency. By 1794, in consequence of the struggles with the Maráthá power, the native troops had been increased to 24,000 men.

In 1796 a general reorganisation of the Indian armies took place. The officers in each Presidency, hitherto borne on general lists according to the

branches of the service to which they belonged, were formed into cadres of regiments, and at the same time an establishment of general officers was created. This was followed by augmentations in numerical strength till, in 1808, the total military force in British India amounted to 24,000 Europeans and 154,000 Natives. The first half of the present century witnessed a series of wars and annexations, which necessitated further increases in the military force. Horse artillery was formed; and the artillery service generally was placed on a strong footing. Regiments of irregular cavalry were added to the establishment, while local corps and contingents were raised, some of which (such as the Punjab Irregular Force and the Haidarábád Contingent) soon became formidable.

The officering and recruiting of the three armies was at the time of the Mutiny in essentials alike in each Presidency. The officers were mainly supplied by the Company's Military College at Addiscombe (established in 1809); direct appointments being made by the Court of Directors. The Bengal Army was recruited from Hindustán, the infantry being chiefly drawn from Oudh and Behar. The soldiers were usually high caste Hindus, but a sixth of them were Muhammadans recruited from Rohilkhand and the Gangetic Doáb. The only other elements in the Bengal Army were the four Gúrkhá regiments enlisted from Nepál and the local Punjab Irregular Force. The Madras Army was chiefly recruited from that Presidency or from the Native States adjoining it,

and consisted of Muhammadans, Bráhmans, Maráthás, Telingás, and Tamils. The Bombay Army was recruited mainly from its own Presidency, but contained some Hindustánis. Most of the Bombay Sepoys were Maráthás and Muhammadans; but the Bombay Light Cavalry were brought for the most part from Hindustán proper.

In the year preceding the Mutiny the Indian Army had reached its highest strength; amounting in numbers to no fewer than 39,000 Europeans of all arms, with 276 field guns and about 320,000 Native troops (including local and irregular forces), with 248 field guns; truly a magnificent establishment: 'outwardly worthy of the great Empire which England had created for herself in the East, but inwardly unsound and on the very eve of crumbling to pieces.'

We are now in a position to rightly appreciate the military reforms carried out subsequent to the Mutiny. The new organisation to which reference has already been made was promulgated in 1863. It entailed changes both in the recruitment and composition of the Indian Army. The Bengal Army is now chiefly composed of Muhammadans, Hindus, Rájputs, Punjabis, and Patháns; and while some regiments are entirely of one race, such as the Gúrkhas and a few Sikh corps, in others different races are mixed by companies or otherwise. There are no official restrictions on caste or race, but care is taken to prevent an undue preponderance of any one class. Enlistment remains purely voluntary. In the Bengal, as in the Madras and Bombay

armies, the native officers are appointed from the non-commissioned ranks, with the exception of a very few natives of rank and position, who obtain direct commissions. The British officers in all three Native armies are obtained through the medium of the Staff Corps already referred to. This Staff Corps is recruited by commissioned volunteers from the British Army, and now supplies the native armies of India with regimental officers.

The Madras Native Army is composed of a limited number of Christians and Muhammadans, and a large proportion of Telingás, or Gentus and Tamils. The cavalry are mostly Arcot Musalmáns, descendants of the soldiers of the old Nawábs of the Karnátik. The army is recruited as in Bengal, but it has a peculiar institution of its own, namely, the 'recruit and pension boys' (sons of soldiers and pensioners) attached to each regiment and transferred to the ranks when they attain a proper standard of age and efficiency;—a valuable institution, which affords a powerful hold upon the fidelity of the men. The Bombay Army resembles that of Bengal in its recruiting, organisation, and equipments. It is composed of a few Christians, some Bráhmans, Rájputs, and other Hindu castes; but mainly Maráthás and Purwaris, with a few Punjabis and Patháns.

It is no easy task to draw comparisons between native soldiers recruited from so many different parts of the Empire. It is generally acknowledged, however, that the most warlike are the inhabitants of Sind, the Punjab, and Trans-Indus territory. Next

to these come the men of Rohilkhand and Oudh, and the Maráthás. All these races possess a keener aptitude for military training and are usually of a better physique than the general population of the Peninsula. Of the actual value of Native troops, it is still more difficult to form a correct estimate; but it has been truly said by a distinguished military writer that the natives of India, both as friends and foes, have proved themselves gallant soldiers, not unworthy of being matched with Europeans. The ordinary Sepoy under the guidance of British officers has furnished many instances of heroism and devotion. A Bengal regiment successfully stood the brunt of a charge by the French at the battle of Porto Novo in 1781. The devoted courage of Clive's Sepoys at Arcot and Plassey has passed into a proverb. At the siege of Delhi, in 1857, Native regiments sustained losses which few European troops could have borne; while many of the men then in hospital, with wounds only partly healed, volunteered to join in the final assault.

Our present military position in India affords abundant evidence of the strenuous and successful efforts of Anglo-Indian administrators and commanders to bring the army and its establishments to the highest degree of efficiency attainable. With a view to protection of the country, both against commotions within and aggressive attacks from without, there have been in recent years many important modifications and developments of the reorganisation rendered necessary after the suppression of the Mutiny.

The education of the army generally is now much more carefully attended to than in the old days. Instruction in musketry, gymnastics, and garrison duties is provided; and stricter tests are imposed on all candidates for Staff employ or for promotion. Armed camps of exercise have been instituted, where large bodies of troops are assembled, and opportunities are afforded for higher tactical training. The Commissariat department has been improved and enlarged; the military accounts branch has been remodelled; and the supply and manufacture of *matériel* of war now leaves little ground for criticism. The new regulations for the relief of troops have greatly shortened the British soldier's term of Indian service. For his benefit, too, large barracks have been built on approved principles in the plains, and sanatoria constructed to hold about 10,000 British troops in the hills during the hot weather. By all these and similar measures, and by a liberal expenditure of money on sanitary requirements, the death-rate of the British Army in India has been reduced to one-half what it was in former years.

Other great questions still remain to be dealt with. The conditions which led to the formation and growth of three Presidency armies are materially altered by the development of intercommunication between the various provinces of India; and the system is unlikely to be much longer retained. The expedient of a Staff Corps has been found cumbrous, and its abolition is becoming only a matter of time.

It should be added that the military position of India has been further strengthened by the enrolment of about 20,000 European volunteers, that a reserve of Native soldiers has been organised, and that by reductions on the one hand and improved organisation on the other, carried out under the supervision of experienced British officers, a large number of troops in the pay of our Chiefs and Feudatories have been made effective for service in a second line of defence. Contingents furnished by Native States have already proved in many campaigns that they are valuable auxiliaries.

The contrast between the state of things now and the situation in 1857 is indeed a striking one. At the outbreak of the Mutiny the army in India, as already said, was composed of about 39,000 British and 225,000 Native troops, including men in contingents paid by and serving in Native States. Natives manned more than half the guns; and to a great extent held our arsenals, magazines, and fortifications. At the present time the Army consists of 72,000 British and about 157,000 Native soldiers, including all the regular contingents on the Indian establishment serving in Native States, besides some 170,000 regular police. Out of 103 batteries of artillery, 88 are manned by Europeans. Guns and rifles of the newest pattern have been supplied to the troops. The rapid construction of railways (288 miles of railway were open in 1857-58, there are now 16,000 miles, an extension entailing a cost of two hundred millions sterling)

has facilitated a centralisation of authority, and permits of a rapid concentration of troops at any point either within Indian limits or on the frontier. The improvement of roads and other communications, of frontier defences, barracks, transport services, and field establishments, should also be taken into account ; and a fair survey of the situation must compel even the pessimist observer to admit that, at vast labour and expense, the military position of India is, on the whole, satisfactory, and is being still strengthened, day by day, under the eyes of an ever vigilant Government, aided by experienced military commanders.

Should the question be asked as to the resistance which India could offer, in the event of an attack from without, it may be stated with some confidence that the Government, at the present moment, could put into the field with comparative ease two strong army corps, fully equipped ; while for purposes of a reserve, and on what may be called the lines of interior defence, it would not be difficult to employ, in addition to the number of regular soldiers left behind, a considerable portion of the 32,000 Europeans and the 800,000 native Christians resident in India ; not to mention the assistance which could be obtained from the native population (including about 50,000 Indian Portuguese and Pársís), who might be largely employed, for temporarily holding strategic centres during operations on or beyond the frontier.

It would be undesirable here to enter upon a discussion of various minor details of military organisa-

tion which occupy the attention of those responsible for the safety of our Indian Empire. There are one or two points, however, on which something further may be said. The tendency of every economical or popularity-hunting Government is to cheapen or reduce its army. Such reductions are comparatively easy ; for they are certain to be defended and approved by people who have had no military training and no military experience. In the case of India, there has been a tendency on the part of English financiers to view with favour any proposal for a reduction of European troops in that country, and even to speak of a withdrawal of a portion of them in the event of European complications.

Very different was the view taken by one of the most far-seeing statesmen that ever ruled in India, the late Earl of Mayo. He thought it wrong, indeed, to compel the people of India to contribute one farthing more to military expenditure than the safety and defence of the country absolutely demanded. He declared that a large reduction of the Madras Army was necessary, inasmuch as it was impossible to tax India for the support of a force which had been declared by the highest authorities in the Presidency to be far beyond local requirements, and which from its composition was unreasonably expensive. At the same time he wrote (September 9, 1869): ' One thing I implore may not be done, and that is the removal of a single British bayonet or sabre from India. We can, I believe, reduce our military expenditure by a million

without giving up one of the little white-faced men in red. It is in the *number* of officers and regiments, and in a prudent reduction of the weakest or least efficient portion of our Native Army, that a safe diminution of cost can be obtained ; and this I am prepared to recommend regardless of frowns or forebodings.' And again he wrote (December 11, 1870): 'I have this year, without any suggestion from any quarter, pressed upon her Majesty's Government the necessity that exists for immediately arming every European soldier and volunteer in India with a Snider rifle. I have ever since the beginning of 1869 pointed out the defective state of our artillery force, and recommended the immediate adoption of rifled guns. I never, therefore, let economic considerations interfere in cases of necessity. I have never suggested a reduction which is, in my opinion, calculated to diminish our military strength. But I do desire to reduce military expenditure by a very large amount. I firmly believe that there are forces in India which we should do better without, and that it is better to keep only those Native regiments in arms that would be useful in war. I think it is not desirable to keep a large number of batteries of artillery in an undermanned state, and I believe that if we have a really sufficient number of guns, *fully* manned and equipped, in ample proportions to a force of 60,000 to 70,000 men which can be put into the field at a moment's notice, we have a force more than sufficient to overwhelm anything that can be brought against us without very long

notice. In view of possible war, I should be more anxious to make the reductions I have suggested than I am now ; because if any augmentations are required, they should only be made in certain directions, and if we are disembarassed of comparatively useless corps we can add to the strength of the warlike portion of our army without difficulty.'

Lord Mayo was equally confident, it may be added, that great economy would be effected by constructing all kinds of military stores in India. 'One cap manufactory,' he said (April 17, 1869), 'one gun-carriage manufactory, one gun foundry, &c., ought to suffice for all India. We ought to have the best gun that science can produce without a moment's delay. Above all, our general policy should be to manufacture everything in India, so as to be as independent as possible of England in time of trouble.'

What Lord Mayo wrote, on the necessity of maintaining the strength of the European force in India unimpaired, may well be taken to heart. Fewer batteries, but all fully manned ; and fewer regiments, but all completed to not less than 1000 rank and file, in lieu of half-manned batteries and regiments far short of their complement, would not only admit of economy in the pay of officers and establishments, but would increase the efficiency of the army. And if to this could be added the restoration, in part, of a European force specially enlisted for India, the training of a company of every Infantry Regiment to ride as Mounted Infantry and to take their place, if need

be, in batteries of Artillery, the manufacture of guns and ammunition in India itself, and the establishment of an Indian Navy on a proper footing, there would be but few defects in the defence of India for criticism or attack by friend or foe.

But there is another point which needs mention. While viewing with satisfaction all the improvements that have been effected in the Native Army of India since the Mutiny, and without overlooking the advantages to be gained by abolishing distinctions between districts or Presidencies, and by enlisting the army for general service, we must also bear in mind that it goes a long way towards the contentment of native soldiers to confine the circle of their ordinary service to the limits of their own province, and to march them only on an emergency into distant parts of the Empire. We have hitherto tried experiments in increased pay and *batta* which have not been willingly accepted in lieu of exile. It is therefore worthy of consideration whether more careful attention may not be paid to the fact that nothing can reconcile natives of India to long absence from their homes, and that if we keep regiments ordinarily in a circle near their homes, the service will be rendered more economical and more popular.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

THE work of this little volume is now brought to a close with a consciousness of many deficiencies in language and description, and with a regret that, for reasons already given, but few of those personal acts of heroism which formed so conspicuous a feature of the Indian Mutiny, and which are so valuable in lighting up bare records of military operations, have found a place in its pages. If, however, the desire to give a brief and simple account of important occurrences has been in any measure achieved, the object aimed at by the author has been attained.

A remarkable event which requires exceptional treatment seldom calls for words to enforce its lessons. It needs no effort, therefore, to impress on the reader the many lessons of the Mutiny, not the least of which were the unaccountable blindness with which England almost courted disaster and the splendid effort which she made to repair her error. The cause of the Mutiny was simple; the outbreak was inevitable; the situation was terrible; the struggle was prolonged and fierce; sons and daughters of our race fell without demur at the post of danger; and amid this scene

of woe and desolation, devoted soldiers and sailors of a gracious Sovereign, even those of different nationality from our own, united in giving up their lives in defence of her rights. If the marvellous defence of Lucknow, the fierce struggle before Delhi, the holding of isolated positions by resolute men and women, and the difficult military operations which at length wrested the Empire from the rebel hand can ever be forgotten by a grateful country, then history is no longer history. These events will assuredly not be forgotten. They still burn brightly in the hearts of our countrymen, and they will ever find a place in the lesson-books of our children ; nay, more than this, they will at all times teach England to value the great possession which she holds, and will inspire her to allow no friend or foe to deprive her of it. But what was the cost ? Much in treasure and blood. To compare campaigns carried on under such diverse conditions as those ruling in the Crimea and in India is an almost impossible task. Yet, if the comparison be allowed, we shall perceive that while our casualties in the Crimean Campaign of 1855-56 amounted to 390 officers and 18,058 rank and file, those in the Mutiny Campaign of 1857-58 were not less, so far as can be ascertained, than 195 officers and 10,826 of our gallant British soldiers. In regard to the extent to which the troops suffered in the Mutiny Campaign from casualties in the field on the one hand and from delays in the operations on the other, it may be of interest to note that while 86 British officers and 1948 rank and

file (besides 1240 natives) were killed in action or died of wounds, no fewer than 109 British officers and 8878 rank and file (exclusive of natives of whose casualties under this head the author has been unable to obtain an accurate return) died from exposure and sickness¹. These figures speak for themselves, and fill the mind with mixed feelings; for deeply as we may regret that the apparent advantages of the Crimean Campaign were afterwards wrested from us piecemeal, we must rejoice that by the sacrifices in the Indian operations we regained, against great odds, one of the most valuable possessions of the British Crown.

What more can we say as to the events so inadequately recorded in this volume? Can we think of them for a moment without revering the lives and memories of such men as Henry and John Lawrence, Robert Montgomery, Bartle Frere and others of the Indian Civil Service; that Service which by its courage, calmness and inestimable qualities of decision proved the mainstay of the Empire in the crisis of the Mutiny? Can we look back to the past without

¹ The records of the Mutiny period were of necessity somewhat imperfectly kept. For arriving at these figures, *quantum valeant*, the author owes much to the kindness of the Indian military authorities, and to Director-General Sir W. A. Mackinnon, K.C.B. He may be pardoned for adding that Lord Clyde was warmly attached to his friend Mackinnon, who served on his personal staff during the campaign, after a distinguished training in the Crimea. 'Mac' was well known in the Crimea, India, New Zealand, and Ashanti for his 'combative qualities,' and for his coolness and gallantry in the field.

a feeling of sorrow that such men as Colin Campbell, Hugh Rose, Nicholson, Outram, Havelock, Napier, Hope Grant, Neill and others—men specially raised up in the Providence of God to quell one of the most formidable risings of the present century—now lie in the grave, soldiers of the past? And what of Canning, Elphinstone, the many heads of administrations and provinces, and the trained political officers, who by their courage and influence preserved to English rule wide tracts of country and turbulent populations far exceeding in extent and number many Englands? What of the loyal Indian Chiefs and Princes? What of the native troops who, faithful to their salt, fought against their own comrades in rebellion? What, again, of the British Regimental officers and men, including the devoted medical service, who without reward, and in some cases without thanks, fought and worked nobly for their Queen and Country?

They all, indeed, await their reward in the Great Awakening; and England may truly be grateful when she calls to mind records so brilliant and deeds so honourable, and remembers the glorious part borne by her children in handing down to posterity, notwithstanding shortcomings, failures and errors, one of the most memorable chapters of her memorable history. Still England is aware that her aim is peace, and that while governing the vast Eastern populations committed to her care with firmness and discretion—ready to defend them against a common foe within or without her borders—it were folly to suppose that the

authority of a Sovereign can be upheld by the sword without the attachment of a people, or that the attachment of a people can be of any avail without the power of the sword. Laying to heart the lessons of the past, we are content to believe that the Rulers of India in the future will use with wisdom the means which God has placed in their hands for inspiring the people of that country with affectionate obedience to the British Crown, and for uniting them against either rebel or invader.

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
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